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In 1954, the United States Supreme Court issued its seminal decision 
in Brown v. Board of Education.1 Interpreting and applying the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, a unanimous Court held “that in the field of public education 
the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.”2 In so holding, the Court determined 
that it could “not turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was 
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”3 The 
Court chose, instead, to “consider public education in the light of its full 
development and its present place in American life throughout the 
Nation.”4 
Is Brown consistent with—can the Court’s separate-but-equal-is-
unconstitutional holding be justified by—originalism? This Article 
examines originalists’ affirmative answers to this question. Originalism 
seeks to determine the fixed meaning of constitutional text at the time of 
its adoption and emphasizes constraining interpreters’ discretion and 
ability to introduce and act upon their personal predilections, preferences, 
values, and beliefs when engaged in constitutional interpretation. This 
Article’s focus is on how the “Is Brown originalist?” query addresses the 
claim that originalist analyses of that issue performed the posited 
constraint and discretion-limiting functions. As argued herein, 
originalism is in fact a discretion-laden methodology, providing readers 
of constitutional text with the freedom and flexibility to make discretionary 
and outcome-influential choices as they interpret and apply the document. 
Discretionary originalism, as employed by those seeking to demonstrate 
that Brown was rightly decided as an original matter, calls into question 
the methodology’s capacity to meaningfully constrain, in a principled and 
consistent manner, originalists engaged in the enterprise of interpreting 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  
                                                 
* © 2015 Ronald Turner. Alumnae Law Center Professor of Law, University of 
Houston Law Center. J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., Wilberforce 
University. The author acknowledges and is thankful for the research support provided by 
the Alumnae Law Center donors and the University of Houston Law Foundation. 
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
3 Id. at 492. 
4 Id. at 492–93. 
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Methodologies are not strongly constraining. That is in large measure the 
burden of American constitutional history.5 
 
In the abstract, a legal interpretive theory ought to be able to say “theories 
generate results; results don’t generate theories.”6 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court issued its seminal decision in Brown 
v. Board of Education.7 Interpreting and applying the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,8 a unanimous Court held 
“that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”9 In so holding, the Court 
determined that “we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was 
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”10 The Court chose, 
instead, to “consider public education in the light of its full development and its 
present place in American life throughout the Nation.”11 
The Brown Court did not employ originalism, the label given to a family of 
theories that consider “the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of 
its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the 
present.”12 Is the result in Brown consistent with—can that result be squared with—
originalism? For originalists, much rides on the answer(s) to this question. There is 
a “widespread belief that the [Court’s] decision was inconsistent with the original 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.”13 Michael McConnell has observed 
that the “supposed inconsistency between Brown and the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment has assumed enormous importance in modern debate over 
constitutional theory. Such is the moral authority of Brown that if any particular 
theory does not produce the conclusion that Brown was correctly decided, the theory 
                                                 
5 John Harrison, On the Hypotheses That Lie at the Foundations of Originalism, 31 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 473, 481 (2008). 
6 Will Baude, Does Originalism Justify Brown, and Why Do We Care So Much?, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/ 
2014/01/29/does-originalism-justify-brown-and-why-do-we-care-so-much/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/67MK-R3EG. 
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
8 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).  
9 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
10 Id. at 492. 
11 Id. at 492–93. 
12 Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 
(2004). 
13 FRANK B. CROSS, THE FAILED PROMISE OF ORIGINALISM 92 (2013). 
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is seriously discredited.”14 The late Robert Bork commented, “Brown has become 
the high ground of constitutional theory. Theorists of all persuasions seek to capture 
it, because any theory that seeks acceptance must, as a matter of psychological fact, 
if not of logical necessity, account for the result in Brown.”15 “Precisely because 
Brown has become the crown jewel of the United States Reports,” Pamela Karlan 
has observed, “every constitutional theory must claim Brown for itself. A 
constitutional theory that cannot produce the result reached in Brown . . . is a 
constitutional theory without traction.”16 
This Article examines and critiques originalists’ efforts to demonstrate that 
Brown was correctly decided. More specifically, the Article argues that these efforts 
are grounded in discretion-laden originalist methodologies that allow—indeed 
depend upon—the originalist interpreter’s freedom and flexibility to make outcome-
influential choices when formulating and applying originalist theories. This is a 
matter of significance, for originalism has been championed as a methodology that 
constrains the ability of interpreters (including judges) to resort to and implement 
                                                 
14 Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947, 952 (1995). 
15 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 77 (1990). 
16 Pamela S. Karlan, Lecture, What Can Brown® Do for You?: Neutral Principles and 
the Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1060 (2009); see also 
GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 
105 (1992) (“The acid test of originalism, as indeed of any theory of constitutional 
adjudication, is its capacity to justify what is now almost universally regarded as the Supreme 
Court’s finest hour: its decision in Brown v. Board of Education . . . .” (citation omitted)); 
KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME 
COURT DECISIONS 68 (2006) (while “[s]ome originalists still take the position that Brown 
exemplifies illegitimate judicial decision-making in the name of a desirable result,” “most 
originalists are more concerned to explain how Brown is actually correct on originalist 
grounds, thinking (rightly) that an approach to constitutional interpretation under which 
Brown was wrongly decided will have little appeal for the American public.”); ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL 
INTERPRETATION 280 (2006) (“Some have claimed that any respectable account of 
constitutional adjudication must be able to justify Brown. In view of such claims, theorists 
have gone to implausible lengths to square their accounts with Brown.”); J. HARVIE 
WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 17 (2012) (“Brown affords living 
constitutionalists a nonoriginalist case whose ultimate salutary effect on American equality 
properly renders the result nearly immune from criticism.”); Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s 
Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 21 (2006) 
(discussing Brown and the claim that “because the original meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment cannot deliver the desired result, the meaning of the text must be changed by 
judges to something that is morally superior” and guessing “that this argument motivates the 
approach of ninety percent of constitutional law professors.”); Michael C. Dorf, Equal 
Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 958 (2002) (“[C]onservatives who are 
generally sympathetic to originalism cannot openly say that Brown v. Board of Education 
was wrongly decided” and they “concoct implausible accounts of the Reconstruction Era 
understanding of segregation.” (citation omitted)).  
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their ideological and political preferences as they interpret constitutional 
provisions.17 But originalism is, in fact, a discretionary methodology providing 
ample room for originalists to introduce and act upon their personal predilections, 
preferences, values, and beliefs as they interpret and apply the Constitution.  
As developed herein, discretionary originalism provides originalists with 
several interpretive choice points. First, originalism “is itself a choice.”18 Interpreters 
may choose from a menu of methodologies when considering constitutional 
questions, including originalism, living constitutionalism, common law 
constitutionalism, history, text, purpose, precedent, doctrine, prudence, structure, 
political process concerns, ethical concerns, social values, decisional consequences, 
and moral readings of the document.19 Originalists thus choose that methodology as 
a preferred or the only legitimate interpretive theory. That choice may or may not be 
the correct one, but it is a choice nonetheless.20 
                                                 
17 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1743, 1777 (2013) (noting the premise that “judges will be inclined to implement their 
political or policy preferences; if that were not the case, then the self-constraining advantage 
of originalism, textualism, and rule following would be unnecessary.”). 
18 Eric Posner, Originalism Means Not Always Getting What You Want, ERIC POSNER 
(Feb. 10, 2014), http://ericposner.com/originalism-means-not-always-getting-what-you-
want/, archived at http://perma.cc/WAS5-ST82.  
19 For discussions of interpretive methodologies, see generally PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, at xvi (1991) (discussing how to choose from among six 
types of constitutional arguments “without sacrificing either legitimacy or justice”); PHILIP 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 9–124 (1982) (describing 
six types of constitutional arguments); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING A 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 3 (2008) (exploring the “role of the United States Supreme 
Court in interpreting the Constitution”); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL 
READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2 (1996) (advocating for a “moral reading” of 
the Constitution); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 181 (1980) (arguing for a “representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review”); 
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 1–5 (2010) (rejecting originalism and 
advocating for “a common law approach to the Constitution”). 
20 For an early case in which the Supreme Court chose not to adopt an originalist 
approach, see Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934): 
 
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it 
means to-day, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must 
be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and 
outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own 
refutation. 
 
Id. at 442–43; but see id. at 448–49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (“A provision of the 
Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly opposite 
interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at 
another time . . . . [The meaning of] the contract impairment clause, when framed and adopted 
. . . means the same now.”). 
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Second, originalists may choose from different originalist theories, including 
original intent, original understanding, original public meaning, original methods, 
and framework originalism.21 These “diverse and, to some extent, conflicting 
theories”22 have been developed over time as originalism was “working itself pure”23 
and comprise “big tent” originalism unified “by a core commitment to the 
interpretive primacy of the ‘fixed’ meaning of the constitutional text at the time of 
enactment.”24  
Third, originalists enjoy discretion in framing the inquiry and in choosing what 
they consider to be “the proper level of generality at which a right should be 
characterized.”25 Framing an issue and characterizing a right broadly (for example, 
the right to a public school education) or narrowly and more precisely (for example, 
the right to attend a racially integrated or desegregated public school) is a critical 
descriptive and normative matter, influenced by an interpreter’s value choices and 
substantive positions.26  
Fourth, originalist interpreters choose the parameters of the evidentiary inquiry 
relative to the constitutional question under consideration. Are the evidence and 
facts relevant to the “Is Brown originalist?” inquiry those found in congressional and 
ratification debates over the Fourteenth Amendment? In Reconstruction-era 
understandings of the rights protected by and falling outside the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment? What is the (is there a) relevant time period for an 
originalist evaluation of issues involving the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal 
protection mandate? Is it the amendment proposal and ratification period of 1866–
1868 or some other time period? How does interpreter discretion affect and guide 
the answers to these questions?  
The ensuing discussion of Brown and discretionary originalism unfolds in four 
parts. Part II provides an overview of and commentary on constitutional originalism 
and certain originalist theories (original intent, original understanding, original 
public meaning, and framework originalism) included under the originalism 
umbrella. Part III considers race, racism, and Reconstruction and the factual and 
legal backdrop preceding and culminating in the 1868 adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In addition, Part III focuses on three separate and distinct categories of 
rights recognized in the Reconstruction era—civil, political, and social—and 
                                                 
21 See infra Part II. 
22 Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 493, 573 (2013). 
23 Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the 
Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1114 (2003). 
24 Williams, supra note 22, at 573. 
25 Patrick S. Shin, Discrimination Under a Description, 47 GA. L. REV. 1, 33–34 
(2012). 
26 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 73 
(1991); see also WILKINSON, supra note 16, at 52 (“[D]ebates rage about the original 
understanding of the level of generality of the equal protection clause. Does it forbid 
discrimination on the basis of race? Or does it only forbid discrimination against African 
Americans?” (citation omitted)). 
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explicates the significance of and difficulties presented by this trichotomy of rights 
for those who contend that the result in Brown can be squared with originalism. Part 
IV turns to Brown’s interment of the separate-but-equal doctrine in the context of 
public school education and notes post-Brown arguments and actions by supporters 
of the segregationist status quo invalidated by the Court’s decision, including the 
originalist critique of Brown made in the “Southern Manifesto.” Part V’s discussion 
of originalism and Brown identifies and critiques the various discretionary moves 
and outcome-influential interpretive choices made by originalists. As argued in that 
Part, these moves and choices provide originalists with various interpretive paths to 
their desired Brown-is-originalist terminus, thereby calling into question the theory’s 
capacity to meaningfully constrain, in a principled and consistent manner, originalist 
interpreters of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Article concludes that the instances 
of discretionary originalism examined herein in support of the Brown-is-originalist 
position avoid the undesirable result and outcome—because school segregation did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, Brown was wrongly decided—of an 
undiluted and unflinching originalism.  
 
II.  ORIGINALISM(S): OLD AND NEW 
 
As previously noted, originalists have developed and may choose from a menu 
of differing originalist theories.27 This Part provides a survey of various originalisms 
and their theoretical underpinnings, as well as scholarly critiques identifying the 
weaknesses of the theories discussed herein and responses thereto. This account and 
analysis of the development of diverse and sometimes conflicting originalist theories 
provides the background for the question presented and discussed in this Article: 
whether the result in Brown v. Board of Education can be squared with originalist 
interpretations and applications of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
As noted by Keith Whittington, originalism is both old and new.28 Old 
Originalism,29 emphasizing the intent of the framers of constitutional provisions, 
was said to limit judicial interpreters’ opportunity to substitute their personal 
preferences for constitutional mandates and the values of the people.30 Critics of 
certain decisions of the Warren Court employed original-intent originalism in 
furtherance of the desired ends of limiting judicial discretion and promoting judicial 
                                                 
27 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
28 See Whittington, supra note 12, at 599. 
29 Id. at 599–603. 
30 See Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an “Ism,” 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 
302 (1996) (“[O]riginalism is defensible not because it restrains judges completely, or even 
well, but because it restrains judges better than alternative methods of judging.”); Antonin 
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989) (stating that 
originalism is “less likely to aggravate the most significant weakness of the system of judicial 
review,” that “judges will mistake their own predilections for the law.”); Whittington, supra 
note 12, at 602 (stating that the “primary commitment” of Old Originalism “was to judicial 
restraint.”). 
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restraint.31 In their view, this form of originalism would constrain a court that was 
making rather than interpreting the law32 and was “the movement to curb the 
pretensions of the Warren Court and return the meaning of the Constitution to what 
it said.”33  
Unlike Old Originalism’s focus on the private and subjective intentions of the 
Framers and the understanding of ratifiers of constitutional text,34 New Originalism 
seeks to determine the original public meaning of constitutional text35: “the meaning 
that the words and phrases had (or would have had) to ordinary members of the 
public.”36 For the original public meaning originalist, “the meaning of each 
provision of the Constitution becomes fixed when that provision is framed and 
ratified,” with “meaning” referring to “meaning in the linguistic sense.”37 This 
meaning “has the force of law” and, as “the supreme law of the land,” binds courts 
and officials.38 While one analyst has argued that New Originalism “is grounded 
more clearly and firmly in an argument about what judges are supposed to be 
interpreting and what that implies, rather than an argument about how best to limit 
judicial discretion,”39 another scholar has suggested that New Originalism 
“continues to a substantial degree to emphasize judicial constraint—in the sense of 
promising to narrow the discretion of judges.”40  
The rubric of constitutional originalism is best described as an array of 
constitutional originalisms. Interpreters who choose to employ originalism may 
select from a menu of originalist theories, including those discussed in this Part: 
original intent, original understanding, original public meaning, and framework 
originalism.41 
                                                 
31 See Brad Snyder, The Former Clerks Who Nearly Killed Judicial Restraint, 89 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2129, 2147 (2014); Whittington, supra note 12, at 599–600. 
32 See Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 
HASTINGS L.J. 707, 711 (2011) (noting this view). 
33 Antonin Scalia et al., In Memoriam, Robert H. Bork, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
1231, 1233 (2013). 
34 See Whittington, supra note 12, at 607–12. 
35 Id. at 609–10. 
36 Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 2–3 (2011). 
37 Id. at 2. 
38 Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted). 
39 Whittington, supra note 12, at 609. 
40 Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 751 
(2011). 
41 Other originalist approaches not discussed in the next Part include: (1) Original 
expected application originalism, which “asks how people living at the time the text was 
adopted would have expected it would be applied using language in its ordinary sense (along 
with some terms of art).” JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 7 (2011); Lawrence B. 
Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 935 (2009) 
(original expected application originalism focuses on “expectations about the application of 
that meaning to future cases” and not on the linguistic meaning of the text). (2) Original-
methods originalism, a theory relying on the “interpretive methods that the constitutional 
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A.  Original Intent 
 
The theory of original intent originalism posits that the intent of those who 
drafted and framed constitutional text must be discerned and given effect when 
interpreting the Constitution. 
During the United States Senate Judiciary Committee’s 1967 confirmation 
hearings on the nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the United States Supreme 
Court, North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin (a critic of Brown v. Board of Education) 
asked Marshall the following question: “Is not the role of the Supreme Court simply 
to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the 
people who ratified the Constitution?”42 Marshall responded in the affirmative to 
Ervin’s question while also stating that “the Constitution was meant to be a living 
document.”43  
A few years later, another Court nominee, William H. Rehnquist, assured the 
Judiciary Committee that he would not “disregard the intent of the framers of the 
Constitution and change it to achieve a result that . . . might be desirable for 
                                                 
enactors would have deemed applicable” at the time of the adoption of a constitutional 
provision. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A 
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 
751 (2009); see also JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE 
GOOD CONSTITUTION 82 (2013) [hereinafter MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND 
THE GOOD CONSTITUTION] (arguing that “[a] good constitution enacted under supermajority 
rules should be interpreted according to its original meaning,” with that meaning “determined 
using the interpretive methods that the enactors would have deemed applicable to the 
constitution.”). But see Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About 
Constitutional Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 660 (2009) (arguing that the McGinnis 
and Rappaport approach is “needlessly confusing” and that “even if a majority of those who 
approved a constitution had other methods of interpretation in mind, their assumed or 
expected methods did not thereby become a part of the meaning of the text.”); Kurt T. Lash, 
Originalism All The Way Down?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 165 (2015) (reviewing 
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra) (arguing that 
McGinnis and Rappaport fail to recognize that methods of constitutional interpretation were 
under-resolved and were the subject of debate at the time of the Founding). (3) Decisional 
originalism, Steven Smith’s tentative label for an alternative to original-meaning originalism 
calls for constitutional interpretation and adjudication respecting, as the controlling criterion, 
the original decisions of lawmakers. See Steven D. Smith, Meanings or Decisions? Getting 
Originalism Back on Track, LIBR. L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 2, 2014), 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/meanings-or-decisions-getting-originalism-
back-on-track/, archived at http://perma.cc/3KG5-P2MW.  
42 Nomination of Thurgood Marshall: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
90th Cong. 49 (1967) (statement of Sen. Sam J. Ervin, Jr., Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
43 Id. 
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society.”44 In a subsequent law review article, Justice (later Chief Justice) Rehnquist 
expressed his concern about living constitutionalism and “the substitution of some 
other set of values for those which may be derived from the language and the intent 
of the framers.”45 In his view, the Founding Fathers intended the Constitution itself 
to suggest answers to the manifold problems that they knew would confront 
succeeding generations: “The Constitution that they drafted was indeed intended to 
endure indefinitely, but the reason for this very well-founded hope was the general 
language by which national authority was granted to Congress and the 
Presidency.”46 
Original intent was also advocated by “the father of originalism,”47 Robert 
Bork, as “the only legitimate basis for constitutional decisionmaking.”48 In his 
influential article Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, Bork 
urged that one method of deriving rights from the Constitution “is to take from the 
document rather specific values that text or history show the framers actually to have 
intended and which are capable of being translated into principled rules.”49  
Raoul Berger’s 1977 book Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment championed what Berger termed the “‘original 
intention’—shorthand for the meaning attached by the Framers to the words they 
employed in the Constitution and its Amendments.”50 In support of his position, 
Berger quoted the “archradical” Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner: 
 
Every Constitution embodies the principles of its framers. It is a transcript 
of their minds. If its meaning in any place is open to doubt, or if words are 
used which seem to have no fixed signification, we cannot err if we turn 
to the framers; and their authority increases in proportion to the evidence 
which they left on the question.51  
 
In a 1985 speech to the American Bar Association, Reagan Administration 
Attorney General Edwin Meese shared with the audience his view that 
 
                                                 
44 Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 19 (1971) (statement of Sen. John L. McClellan, 
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
45 William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695 
(1976). 
46 Id. at 699. 
47 Steven G. Calabresi & Lauren Pope, Judge Robert H. Bork and Constitutional 
Change: An Essay on Ollman v. Evans, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 155, 155 (2013). 
48 Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 823, 823 (1986). 
49 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. 
L.J. 1, 17 (1971). 
50 RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 402 (2d ed. 1997). 
51 Id. at 409–10 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866)). 
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[a]s the ‘faithful guardians of the Constitution,’ the judges were expected 
to resist any political effort to depart from the literal provisions of the 
Constitution. The text of the document and the original intention of those 
who framed it would be the judicial standard in giving effect to the 
Constitution.52 
 
Meese announced that the Reagan Administration would “press for a jurisprudence 
of original intention. In the cases that we file and those we join as amicus, we will 
endeavor to resurrect the original meaning of constitutional provisions . . . .”53 
The theory of original-intent originalism was persuasively critiqued. Three 
months after Meese’s speech to the ABA, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. addressed 
“those who find legitimacy in fidelity to what they call ‘the intentions of the 
Framers.’”54 “In its most doctrinaire incarnation, this view demands that Justices 
discern exactly what the Framers thought about the question under consideration and 
simply follow that intention in resolving the case before them.”55 Justice Brennan 
observed that this view “feigns self-effacing deference to the specific judgments of 
those who forged our original social compact” and “is little more than arrogance 
cloaked as humility. It is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage we can gauge 
accurately the intent of the Framers on application of principle to specific, 
contemporary questions.”56 Stating that the Framers did not agree about the meaning 
or application of specific constitutional provisions and “hid their differences in 
cloaks of generality,” he noted that “it is far from clear whose intention is relevant—
that of the drafters, the congressional disputants, or the ratifiers in the states?”57 
Academic critiques of original-intent originalism were powerful and 
devastating.58 Ronald Dworkin opined, “there is no such thing as the intention of the 
Framers waiting to be discovered . . . .”59 Paul Brest argued that it is impossible to 
determine institutional intent by counting the “individual intention-votes” of “a 
single multimember law-making body, and a fortiori where the assent of several 
such bodies were required.”60 While one framer of a constitutional provision may 
have had a “determinate intent,” other Framers may have had an indeterminate intent 
or no intent whatsoever, and those with an indeterminate intent may have “intended 
                                                 
52 Edwin Meese III, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Before the American Bar Association 
(July 9, 1985), in ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47–48 (Steven G. 
Calabresi ed., 2007). 
53 Id. at 54. 
54 Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium (Oct. 




58 See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 248 
(2009) (describing the criticism of original-intent originalism as “savage”). 
59 Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 477 (1981). 
60 Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 
204, 214 (1980). 
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to delegate to future decisionmakers the authority to apply the clause in light of the 
general principles underlying it.”61 Referring to statutory interpretation practices and 
canons of the eighteenth through the mid-nineteenth century, Brest argued that those 
practices “suggest[ ] that the adopters assumed—if they assumed anything at all—a 
mode of interpretation that was more textualist than intentionalist.”62 He also made 
the critical point that one must determine the level of generality and abstraction at 
which the purported collective intention is to be understood.63 
In another influential critique, H. Jefferson Powell argued “[t]he Philadelphia 
framers’ primary expectation regarding constitutional interpretation was that the 
Constitution, like any other legal document, would be interpreted in accord with its 
express language.”64 He found “no indication that they expected or intended future 
interpreters to refer to any extratextual intentions revealed in the convention’s 
secretly conducted debates.”65 As noted by Lawrence Solum, “[t]he strongest 
implication of [Powell’s] article is that original intentions originalism is a self-
effacing theory because it requires that the Framers’ intentions regarding 
interpretation be respected, but those intentions require that the Framers’ intentions 
be disregarded.”66 
 
B.  Original Understanding 
 
In the wake of the aforementioned critiques of original-intent originalism, the 
focus of originalist theory shifted to the original understanding of the Constitution’s 
ratifiers.67 This move responded to the argument that the document drafted at the 
Philadelphia Convention and by the Congresses proposing amendments thereto had 
no legal effect until they were approved by ratifying conventions and state 
legislatures.68 Framers’ intention did not control; “it is what the Ratifiers understood 
the Framers to have intended or, better yet, what the Ratifiers understood the words 
and phrases themselves to mean that should count. This might be subtly (or 
significantly) different from what was in fact subjectively intended by the 
provision’s drafters.”69 
Robert Bork, at one time a proponent of original-intent originalism,70 embraced 
a different version of the methodology in his book The Tempting of America: The 
                                                 
61 Id. at 214, 216. 
62 Id. at 215. 
63 See id. at 216–17. 
64 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885, 903 (1985). 
65 Id. 
66 Solum, supra note 41, at 929. 
67 See id. at 930 (discussing original understanding originalism’s emphasis on “either 
the state ratifying conventions understood as corporate bodies or of the individuals who 
attended the ratifying conventions and voted in favor of ratification.”). 
68 See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 23, at 1137. 
69 Id. 
70 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
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Political Seduction of the Law.71 Remarking that original-intent originalism “is now 
very much out of favor among the theorists of the field,”72 he wrote that 
 
[s]ecret reservations or intentions count for nothing. All that counts is how 
the words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time. 
The original understanding is thus manifested in the words used and in 
secondary materials, such as debates at the conventions, public discussion, 
newspaper articles, dictionaries in use at the time, and the like.73 
 
Reliance on ratifier understanding does not obviate many of the problematic 
aspects of original-intent originalism and the “paradox of numerosity.”74 Efforts to 
determine an operative ratifiers’ understanding present the difficult problem of 
ascertaining the intention not of one group of Framers, but of many groupings of 
persons meeting in a number of ratifying conventions.75 By this logic, 
 
The individual intentions of drafters or adopters must be shared by a 
sufficient number of delegates to count as law, but unless those intentions 
are understood at a level of generality too high to give practical guidance, 
it will often be the case that individual Framers—and a fortiori individual 
adopters—had either an indeterminate intent or none at all with respect to 
particular questions.76 
 
C.  Original Public Meaning 
 
The discussion now turns to “the mainstream of originalist theory”: original 
public meaning originalism.77 
In a 1986 speech, United States Court of Appeals Judge (later Supreme Court 
Justice) Antonin Scalia stated that he “ought to campaign to change the label [of 
originalism] from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original 
Meaning.”78 Focusing on the “original intent of the Constitution,” rather than on the 
“original intent of the Framers,” he stated that one must ask, “What was the most 
plausible meaning of the words of the Constitution to the society that adopted it—
                                                 
71 BORK, supra note 15, at 143–44.  
72 Id. at 143. 
73 Id. at 144. 
74 Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1687 
(2012). 
75 See Solum, supra note 41, at 930. 
76 Greene, supra note 74, at 1687. 
77 Solum, supra note 36, at 9–10. 
78 Justice Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on 
Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 101, 106 (1987). 
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regardless of what the Framers might secretly have intended?”79 For Justice Scalia, 
those who invoked the “original intent” of the “Founding Fathers” invoked them as 
“strong indications of what the most knowledgeable people of the time understood 
the words to mean.”80  
Addressing the difference between original intent and original meaning 
originalism in 1997, Justice Scalia remarked, “What I look for in the Constitution is 
precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the 
original draftsmen intended.”81 In his view, “the Great Divide with regard to 
constitutional interpretation is not that between Framers’ intent and objective 
meaning, but rather that between original meaning . . . and current meaning.”82 The 
Justice rejected the notion of “The Living Constitution, a body of law that . . . grows 
and changes from age to age, in order to meet the needs of a changing society.”83 “It 
certainly cannot be said that a constitution naturally suggests changeability; to the 
contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed certain rights in such a 
manner that future generations cannot readily take them away.”84 
                                                 
79 Id. at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 576–77 (2008) (“[T]he Constitution was written to be understood by the 
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from 
technical meaning,” including “an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical 
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.” 
(quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)). 
80 Scalia, supra note 78, at 103; see also id. at 104–05 (arguing that “it is perfectly clear 
that the original intent was that the Constitution would be interpreted according to its original 
meaning” and citing Alexander Hamilton and James Madison in support of that position). 
81 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
82 Id. Original meaning versus current meaning was discussed in a recent interview in 
which Justice Scalia was asked whether the Fourteenth Amendment applied to sex 
discrimination. It did not, he stated: “You do not need the Constitution to reflect the wishes 
of the current society. Certainly the Constitution does not require discrimination on the basis 
of sex. The only issue is whether it prohibits it. It doesn’t. Nobody ever thought that that’s 
what it meant. Nobody ever voted for that.” The Originalist, CAL. LAW. (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?eid=913358, archived at http://perma.cc/QQL5-
8GAL.  
83 Scalia, supra note 81, at 38. 
84 Id. at 40; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 92 (2012) (espousing original-meaning originalism and 
renouncing the search for historical intent). Justice Scalia at one time confessed that he was 
“a faint-hearted originalist” and could not imagine upholding a statute imposing the 
punishment of flogging. Scalia, supra note 30, at 864. He recently stated that he now attempts 
to be a stout-hearted and honest originalist. Jennifer Senior, In Conversation: Antonin Scalia, 
N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 6, 2013), http://nymag.com/news/features/antonin-scalia-2013-10/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8MMS-2ZV2; see also MARCIA COYLE, THE ROBERTS COURT: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 165 (2013) (noting that Justice Scalia “has ‘recanted’ 
being a ‘faint-hearted originalist.’”). 
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Justice Scalia has also observed that the “greatest defect” of originalism “is the 
difficulty of applying it correctly” and that “it is often exceedingly difficult to plumb 
the original understanding of an ancient text.”85 Done correctly, the methodology 
“requires the consideration of an enormous mass of material” and “immersing 
oneself in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time—somehow placing 
out of mind knowledge that we have which an earlier age did not, and putting on 
beliefs, attitudes, philosophies, prejudices and loyalties that are not those of our 
day.”86 
Consider Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen’s theory of original, 
objective-public-meaning textualism.87 They posit that the “interpreter who applies 
the Constitution as law must be bound by the meaning of the words and phrases 
written down in the text,”88 with that meaning faithfully applied “in accordance with 
the meaning they would have had at the time they were adopted as law.”89 For 
Kesavan and Paulsen, the originalist inquiry asks how constitutional words and 
phrases “would have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-
informed reader of those words and phrases, in context, at the time they were 
adopted, and within the political and linguistic community in which they were 
adopted.”90 Where an answer to a constitutional question is not expressly answered 
by the text, they instruct that reference should be made to second-best sources of 
original public meaning, including early treatises on the Constitution, the public 
debates of the ratifying conventions, and the public writings of the Anti-Federalists 
and the Federalists.91 
Another proponent of original public meaning originalism, Gary Lawson, does 
not focus on the original meaning held by actual people. Instead, he asks 
                                                 
85 Scalia, supra note 30, at 856.  
86 Id. at 856–57. 
87 See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 23, at 1132. 
88 Id. at 1129. 
89 Id. at 1131. 
90 Id. at 1132. 
91 Id. at 1148–53. “[A]cademic writers and jurists have cited the Federalist Papers as 
evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution more than any other historical source 
except the text of the Constitution itself.” Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the 
Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 
B.U. L. REV. 801, 802 (2007). In assessing the evidentiary value of the Federalist Papers it 
should be noted that “there is substantial reason to doubt that many of the ratifiers actually 
read the Federalist Papers.” Id. at 822. The Papers “had a very small circulation,” id. at 827, 
and, given the secrecy of the Constitutional Convention, the Papers’ authors “could have 
distorted purposefully (or even accidentally) the original intent without much fear of 
contradiction.” Id. at 836; see also JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION: TRIUMPHS AND 
TRAGEDIES AT THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC 117 (2007) (“[T]here is reason to believe 
that The Federalist has exerted more influence on modern-day constitutional arguments than 
on the eighteenth-century debates that occasioned it. Its distribution beyond New York was 
spotty; with a few exceptions, the language of the essays was inaccessible to ordinary 
readers; and its greatest impact was to galvanize support among Federalist delegates already 
committed to ratification.”).  
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how a fully informed public audience, knowing all that there is to know 
about the Constitution and the surrounding world, would understand a 
particular provision. Actual historical understandings are, of course, 
relevant to that inquiry, but they do not conclude or define the inquiry—




the touchstone is not the specific thoughts in the heads of any particular 
historical people—whether drafters, ratifiers, or commentators, however 
distinguished and significant within the drafting and ratification processes 
they may have been—but rather the hypothetical understandings of a 
reasonable person who is artificially constructed by lawyers. The thoughts 
of historical figures may be relevant, but the ultimate inquiry is legal.93  
 
The meaning of a constitutional provision is therefore determined by “the mental 
states that would have been held by some person or persons who might or might not 
ever have actually existed under conditions that might or might not ever have been 
actually realized.”94 
Original-meaning originalism also implicates the issue of the meaning of 
“meaning.” “‘Meaning’ is a capacious concept, and indeed, it has many different 
meanings, including semantic content, purposes, intentions, practical entailments, 
and cultural associations. Conceived most broadly, ‘meaning’ includes a vast array 
of cultural associations, traditions, conventions, and background assumptions.”95 
Given the ambiguity of the word “meaning,” any discernment or “version of 
‘original meaning’ in legal interpretation must inevitably carve out a subset of these 
cultural meanings and treat this portion as remaining in legal force over time.”96 
Selection of a subset of “meaning” is not “natural and value-free”; it is a 
discretionary choice informed by an interpreter’s view and understanding of the 
purposes of the Constitution and of constitutional interpretation.97 Whatever choice 
                                                 
92 Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002). 
93 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. 
COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006); see also id. at 72 (The hypothetical reasonable person “obviously 
had a high degree of intelligence and education” and a “strong commitment to human reason” 
and, whether or not a lawyer, “is learned in the law.”); id. at 73 (The “reasonable person of 
the law” is “highly intelligent and educated and capable of making and recognizing subtle 
connections and inferences” and “is familiar with the peculiar language and conceptual 
structure of the law.”). 
94 Id. at 56. 
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should be made “cannot be settled by the meaning of ‘meaning,’ much less the 
meaning of ‘original.’”98  
As with other originalist theories, original public meaning originalism has been 
the subject of critique. Richard Kay contends that there is “no ‘real’ public meaning. 
Public meaning is, quite explicitly, an artificial construct.”99 That “the general public 
might have understood the proposed text in a particular way . . . does not mean that 
any particular number of them approved of the text understood in any way.”100 
Moreover, “it is hard to explain why interpreters should prefer the public meaning, 
which, by hypothesis, we believe the constitution-makers did not intend.”101  
Deciding the meaning of constitutional text by reference to “what the public 
most likely thought” the text meant when it was enacted102 can be problematic where 
much of the public was politically ignorant. In his insightful analysis of rational 
voter behavior and political ignorance,103 Ilya Somin points out that original public 
meaning originalism implicitly assumes a certain level of public knowledge at the 
time of the ratification of constitutional provisions.104 With respect to eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century America, there is reason to believe that the levels of political 
knowledge were not high, given barriers to the acquisition of information, low 
literacy levels, and long hours of work that left people with less time to learn about 
political issues.105 As the reasonable person, championed by some original public 
meaning advocates, “presumably would have knowledge limitations similar to those 
of actual members of the public at the time,”106 political ignorance poses a problem 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 720 (2009). 
100 Id. at 706–07. 
101 Id. at 713. 
102 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3075 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing the public’s understanding of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause at the time of its enactment). 
103 “Because the chance of any one vote influencing the outcome of an election is 
infinitesimally small, there is little or no incentive to become knowledgeable about politics 
if the only reason for doing so is to become a ‘better’ voter.” Ilya Somin, Originalism and 
Political Ignorance, 97 MINN. L. REV. 625, 643 (2012) [hereinafter Somin, Originalism]. 
For more on this subject, see generally ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL 
IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 3–4 (2013) (summarizing the extent 
of political ignorance in the United States and the problems it creates). 
104 See Somin, Originalism, supra note 103, at 630. The implicit assumptions are: (1) 
“the public knows that the relevant constitutional provision has been enacted, or at least is 
under consideration”; (2) “the public knows that the relevant provision applies to whatever 
issue happens to be under consideration by the observer seeking to determine the original 
meaning”; and (3) “the public must have some knowledge or understanding of how that 
particular issue would be resolved under” the proposed constitutional provision. Id. at 631.  
105 Id. at 643 (“At the time of ratification, some of the Founding Fathers themselves 
believed that public knowledge of politics was low and worried about allowing too much 
public influence over policy.”). 
106 Id. at 633. 
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for original public meaning originalism: “there may not be any clear original 
meaning of a constitutional provision because a rationally ignorant electorate simply 
did not know about the issue.”107  
Commentators have also questioned and criticized the hypothetical reasonable 
person approach to original public meaning. “Scholars invoking such imaginary 
readers do not seem to be familiar with the rich scholarly literature on reader-
response literary criticism, the history of publishing and reading, or recent historical 
writing on the social and cultural history of the Founding era.”108 Why should the 
meaning of a constitutional provision be the meaning held by a purportedly objective 
reasonable person? Who is, and how does one define, that person? Larry Alexander 
makes the cogent observation that the  
 
hypothetical person cannot be nonarbitrarily constructed: Is the person a 
he or a she? Does he or she live in the city or the country? How much 
education and of which kind has he or she had? How much information 
does he or she possess about the law in question and the reasons behind its 
promulgation, etc.?109  
 
How those who construct a (their) reasonable person answer these questions can 
affect interpretive approaches and outcomes. And “it would not be surprising if a 
judicial interpreter were to hit upon a reasonable speaker who might view the 
relevant language as supporting a rule that the interpreter thinks a proper constitution 
ought to have.”110 
 
D.  Framework Originalism 
 
“Is our Constitution a living document that adapts to changing circumstances, 
or must we interpret it according to its original meaning?”111 Believing that this 
“choice is a false one,” Jack Balkin has formulated a constitutional theory called 
“framework originalism,” a “text and principle” theory of interpretation and 
construction that “is both originalist and living constitutionalist.”112 
“Framework . . . originalism views the Constitution as an initial [governing] 
framework” within which politics begins “and must be filled out over time through 
constitutional construction.”113 The theory requires judges to apply the original 
                                                 
107 Id. at 667. 
108 Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas: 
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 735 (2013). 
109 Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 
541 (2013). 
110 Kay, supra note 99, at 722. 
111 BALKIN, supra note 41, at 3. 
112 Id.  
113 Id. at 21. Constitutional construction of legal text involves a two-step process. The 
first step, interpretation, discerns the linguistic meaning of the text. The second step, 
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meaning of the Constitution and assumes that judges will engage in, elaborate, and 
apply constitutional constructions.114 Under this approach, “fidelity to original 
public meaning entails fidelity to our abstract framework and commitments,”115 not 
fidelity to the original intention or expected applications of those who drafted and 
ratified constitutional provisions.116 
Balkin’s text-and-principle model recognizes that 
 
[t]he text of [the] Constitution . . . contains determinate rules (the President 
must be thirty-five, there are two houses of Congress)[,] . . . standards (no 
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ . . .)[,] . . . [and] principles (no 
prohibitions of the free exercise of religion, no abridgements of the 
freedom of speech, no denials of equal protection).117  
 
Why those who designed the Constitution chose to use certain language demands 
our attention, Balkin urges.118 Fixed rules are used to limit discretion.119 Standards 
or principles are used “to channel politics through certain key concepts but delegate 
the details to future generations”120 and must be applied “to our own circumstances 
in our own time.”121 Balkin’s approach, which views history as a resource, differs 
from what he calls conservative originalism, which views history as a command.122 
 
* * * 
 
As discussed in this Part, originalism is more accurately described and 
understood as originalisms. The foci of and questions posed by originalist 
interpreters of the Constitution have concentrated on the Framers, the ratifiers, the 
public at the time of the adoption of a constitutional provision, hypothetical 
reasonable persons, or interpreters engaging in constitutional constructions and 
displaying fidelity to the Constitution’s abstract framework and commitments.  
                                                 
construction, “enables officials to apply the text” as courts “fashion doctrines or rules of 
constitutional law.” Solum, supra note 36, at 3. 
114 BALKIN, supra note 41, at 22. 
115 James E. Fleming, Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1785, 
1793 (2013). 
116 JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST 
WORLD 229–30 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION].  
117 BALKIN, supra note 41, at 6. 
118 Id. (“If the text [of the Constitution] states a determinate rule, we must apply the rule 
because that is what the text offers us. . . . [We] should pay careful attention to the reasons 
why constitutional designers choose particular kinds of language.”). 
119 Id. (“Adopters use fixed rules because they want to limit discretion . . . .”) 
120 Id. at 7. 
121 Id. For an argument critiquing and finding doubtful Balkin’s claim that some 
constitutional norms are “principles,” see Larry Alexander, The Method Of Text and ?: Jack 
Balkin’s Originalism With No Regrets, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 611, 614 (2012). 
122 BALKIN, supra note 41, at 229. 
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The question here is whether the result in Brown v. Board of Education can be 
squared with any of the foregoing originalist approaches to and accounts of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Before turning to that issue in Part III, 
the next Part presents a brief overview of race, racism, the post-Civil War 
Reconstruction, and the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 
III.  RACE, RACISM, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
 
The issue presented in Brown v. Board of Education—whether state-mandated 
racial segregation in public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—should be situated in and requires consideration of this 
nation’s history of the enslavement of Africans and their progeny, constitutional 
acknowledgement and protection of the system of chattel slavery, and the failed 
post-Civil War Reconstruction during which the Fourteenth Amendment was 
proposed and ratified. These aspects of the country’s history of white supremacy, 
racial hierarchy, and subordination of enslaved persons form the factual, contextual, 
and legal background for the discussion of the political and intellectual atmosphere 
preceding and culminating in the 1868 adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 
A.  The Constitution, the Color Line, and Slavery 
 
The color line123 was an indisputable feature of the United States Constitution 
of 1789, a document built on the exclusion of African Americans, which is “rightly 
seen as the original sin of the United States.”124 While the original Constitution did 
not explicitly use the terms “race” or “slavery,” a number of constitutional 
provisions concerned those subjects.125 The Constitution expressly prohibited 
congressional interference with the slave trade prior to the year 1808;126 provided 
that enslaved people who escaped to a free state were to be “delivered up” and 
returned to the enslavers from which they fled;127 and mandated that enslaved people 
were to be counted as “three fifths of all other Persons” for purposes of determining 
                                                 
123 See W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 45 (David W. Blight & Robert 
Gooding-Williams eds., Bedford Books 1997) (1903) (“The problem of the twentieth century 
is the problem of the color-line,—the relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia 
and Africa, in America and the islands of the sea.”). 
124 MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION, supra note 
41, at 10. 
125 See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL 
JUSTICE 4 (1987) (noting that “racial issues have riveted attention” of the country’s decision 
makers). 
126 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. Article V of the Constitution provided that no 
amendment could be made prior to 1808 that would “in any Manner affect” Article I, Section 
9. See id. art. V. 
127 Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3; see Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 561 (1842) 
(explaining that the Constitution “declares that the fugitive shall be delivered up, on claim, 
to the party to whom his service or labour may be due.”). 
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representation in the United States House of Representatives and the Electoral 
College and for levying taxes among the states.128  
The United States thus began “in black plunder and white democracy, two 
features that are not contradictory but complementary.”129 Africans were enslaved 
and “plundered of their bodies, plundered of their families, and plundered of their 
labor.”130 Black bodies created wealth for enslavers and for others; indeed, those 
bodies were the largest financial asset in the nation’s economy.131 Black families 
were sundered. An enslaved person in parts of the South “stood a 30 percent chance 
of being sold in his or her lifetime. Twenty-five percent of interstate trades destroyed 
a first marriage and half of them destroyed a nuclear family.”132 The enslaved were 
subjected to forced migration and were whipped, tortured, and murdered by 
enslavers, aggressively and viciously pursuing ever greater production by black 
children, women, and men.133 Cotton “dominated US exports and the financial sector 
[and] also drove the expansion of northern industry.”134 Textiles made from cotton 
“employ[ed] a working class whose wages created a consumer market that 
encouraged ever more dynamic market production in other areas.”135  
The “peculiar institution” of this nation’s chattel, slavery,136 was justified in 
part by a white-supremacist theory of congenital inferiority, which posited that 
Africans and their descendants were genetically and intellectually inferior to 
                                                 
128 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The federal ratio enshrined in the three-fifths clause 
“rewarded the southern states, artificially inflating their House seats and electoral votes and 
helping to explain why four of the first five presidents hailed from Virginia.” RON CHERNOW, 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 239 (2004). For more on the three-fifths clause, see GARRY WILLS, 
“NEGRO PRESIDENT”: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 2 (2003); GORDON S. WOOD, 
EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 532 (2009).  
129 Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/05/the-case-for-reparations/361631/, 




133 See EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND THE 
MAKING OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 140–43 (2014) (describing the ways slave owners 
tortured their slaves). 
134 Id. at 317. 
135 Id. at 318; SVEN BECKERT, EMPIRE OF COTTON: A GLOBAL HISTORY 244 (2014) 
(discussing America’s ascent to dominance in the world cotton market and noting that 
“[s]lavery stood at the center of the most dynamic and far-reaching production complex in 
human history”); BECKERT, supra (“Cotton, and thus slavery, were indispensable to the 
modern world, the very foundation of the United States’ and Europe’s astonishing material 
advances.”). 
136 See generally KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE 
ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 197–236 (The Easton Press 1995) (1956) (relating the laws, rules, and 
customs regulating slavery in the ante-bellum South).  
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whites.137 This racist view can be found in the pages of the United States Reports. In 
its infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford138 decision, described by one scholar as “the 
original sin of originalism,”139 the Supreme Court held that Africans and their 
descendants were not and could not be citizens of the United States.140 Chief Justice 
Roger Brooke Taney (an owner of slaves)141 described enslaved persons as “beings 
of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in 
social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the 
white man was bound to respect.”142 Taney declared that members of “that race” 
“were not even in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they were 
conferring special rights and privileges upon the citizens of a State in every other 
part of the Union.”143 “Indeed,” he opined, “when we look to the condition of this 
race in the several States at the time, it is impossible to believe that these rights and 
privileges were intended to be extended to them.”144 
                                                 
137 See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RACE AND HISTORY: SELECTED ESSAYS 1938–1988, at 
325 (1989). Francis Scott Key, the author of the Star Spangled Banner, held this view. 
JEFFERSON MORLEY, SNOW-STORM IN AUGUST: WASHINGTON CITY, FRANCIS SCOTT KEY, 
AND THE FORGOTTEN RACE RIOT OF 1835, at 40 (2012) (“Key shared a general view of the 
free people of color as shiftless and untrustworthy: a nuisance, if not a menace, to white 
people. He spoke publicly of Africans in America as ‘a distinct and inferior race of people, 
which all experience proves to be the greatest evil that afflicts a community.’”). See generally 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 138–43 (William Peden ed., 1954) 
(setting forth Jefferson’s views on the supposed inferiority of black persons).  
138 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. 
139 B. Jessie Hill, Resistance to Constitutional Theory: The Supreme Court, 
Constitutional Change, and the “Pragmatic Moment,” 91 TEX. L. REV. 1815, 1833 (2013); 
see also Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22 n.51 (2009) 
(“Given the universal opprobrium that attaches to Dred Scott, it is unsurprising that 
Originalists would seek to disavow it.”). 
140 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404 (“The question before us is, whether [African Americans] 
. . . compose a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We 
think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be included, under 
the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and 
privileges which the instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States.”). 
141 See JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, 
AND THE PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS 90 (2006). 
142 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407. 
143 Id. at 411–12. 
144 Id. at 412. Chief Justice Taney also determined that the phrase “all men are created 
equal” in the Declaration of Independence “would seem to embrace the whole human family, 
and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day [they] would be so understood.” Id. 
at 410. However, he concluded, “it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race 
were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted 
this declaration . . . .” Id. The “great men” “who framed this declaration . . . perfectly 
understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be understood by 
others; and they knew that it would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed to 
embrace the negro race . . . .” Id.  
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B.  Reconstruction, the Black Codes, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
 
During the post-Civil War Reconstruction,145 much of which “was a failure in 
its time,”146 slavery was formally banned in 1865 by the Thirteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution.147 Three and one half million enslaved persons were freed, joining 
approximately half a million individuals who escaped slavery during the Civil 
War.148 
Emancipation was met by a vigorous and violent backlash in the former states 
of the Confederacy.149 As noted by William A. Sinclair, an individual who was 
enslaved at birth, “the white people of the South . . . regarded the freeing of the 
colored man as a wrong to the white man.”150 Efforts by Radical Republicans to 
reconstruct the nation were resisted by redeemers, “White Liners, Red Shirts, and 
Klansmen bent on upholding a society formed for the white, not for the black 
man.”151 The Ku Klux Klan, a paramilitary outfit founded at the beginning of 
Reconstruction by Confederate veterans, commenced a campaign of harassment, 
intimidation, and murder.152 This form of new slavery was imposed and pursued via 
Black Codes,153 returning freedpersons to “a condition as close to their former one 
                                                 
145 See An Act to Provide for the More Efficient Government of the Rebel States 
(Military Reconstruction Act), ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). This legislation divided the 
South into five military districts, and provided that military rule would end and readmission 
of the Confederate states into the United States would be permitted when those states 
established new governments and new state constitutions, ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and granted African Americans the right to vote. Id. §§ 1, 5, 14 Stat. at 428–
29. 
146 Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 MD. L. REV. 978, 997 
(2012); see also DOUGLAS R. EGERTON, THE WARS OF RECONSTRUCTION: THE BRIEF, 
VIOLENT HISTORY OF AMERICA’S MOST PROGRESSIVE ERA 19 (2014) (arguing that 
Reconstruction “did not fail” but “was violently overthrown”). 
147 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall 
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”). 
148 JIM DOWNS, SICK FROM FREEDOM: AFRICAN-AMERICAN ILLNESS AND SUFFERING 
DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 21 (2012). 
149 See WILLIAM A. SINCLAIR, THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY: A STUDY OF THE 
CONDITION AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO 3 (Afro-Am Press 1969) (1905). 
150 Id.  
151 Coates, supra note 129 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
152 See STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET: BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES IN 
THE RURAL SOUTH FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION 27580 (2003) (discussing an 
investigation of the paramilitary politics of the Ku Klux Klan). 
153 As described by the United States Supreme Court, Black Codes “imposed upon the 
colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, 
liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value . . . .” Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1872).  
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as it was possible to get without actually reinstituting slavery.”154 In a 1907 book, 
Columbia University history professor William Archibald Dunning155 described the 
codes as 
 
a conscientious and straightforward attempt to bring some sort of order out 
of the social and economic chaos which a full acceptance of the results of 
war and emancipation involved . . . . The freedmen were not, and in the 
nature of the case could not for generations be, on the same social, moral, 
and intellectual plane with the whites; and this fact was recognized by 
constituting them a separate class in the civil order.156  
 
Responding to the Black Codes,157 the United States Congress, over the veto of 
“fervent Negrophobe” President Andrew Johnson,158 passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1866. That legislation provided, in pertinent part: 
 
[A]ll persons born in the United States . . . are hereby declared to be 
citizens of the United States; and such citizens . . . shall have the same 
                                                 
154 NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR 34 (2006); 
see also SINCLAIR, supra note 149, at 74 (Southerners used the Black Codes “to suppress the 
colored man” and “make his condition worse under emancipation than it was under slavery 
. . . .”). 
Post-slavery Black Codes were not the first such codes in the history of the United 
States, as several post-Revolutionary northern states enacted codes denying fundamental 
rights to black persons and limiting their opportunities to obtain work. See JACQUELINE 
JONES, A DREADFUL DECEIT: THE MYTH OF RACE FROM THE COLONIAL ERA TO OBAMA’S 
AMERICA 101 (2013).  
155 The “Dunning school of Reconstruction historiography” assumed “negro 
incapacity” and “portrayed African Americans either as ‘children,’ ignorant dupes 
manipulated by unscrupulous whites, or as savages, their primal passions unleashed by the 
end of slavery.” ERIC FONER, FOREVER FREE: THE STORY OF EMANCIPATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION, at xxii (2005). John W. Burgess, a leading Dunning school figure and “a 
founder of American political science, taught that ‘a black skin means membership in a race 
of men which has never of itself succeeded in subjecting passion to reason, and has never, 
therefore, created any civilization of any kind.’” Id.; see also Greene, supra note 146, at 1006 
(“Through the middle of the twentieth century, the dominant narrative of Reconstruction was 
supplied by denizens of the Dunning School . . . .”). 
156 WILLIAM ARCHIBALD DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC 
1865–1877, at 58 (1907). 
157 See BERGER, supra note 50, at 34 (the 1866 Civil Rights Bill was “a studied response 
to a perceived evil, the Black Codes, which the Republicans averred were designed to set 
emancipation at naught, to restore the shackles of the prior Slave Codes, and to return the 
blacks to serfdom.” (citation omitted)); see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 18631877, at 243–45, 454–59 (1988) (outlining Congress’s 
response to the Black Codes).  
158 RANDALL KENNEDY, THE PERSISTENCE OF THE COLOR LINE: RACIAL POLITICS AND 
THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 42 (2011); accord Annette Gordon-Reed, ANDREW JOHNSON 112, 
124 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Sean Wilentz eds., 2011). 
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right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give 
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings 
for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and 
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, 
any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary 
notwithstanding.159 
 
As the Supreme Court noted in 1883, in enacting the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 
Congress  
 
did not assume, under the authority given [to it] by the Thirteenth 
Amendment, to adjust what may be called the social rights of men and 
races in the community; but only to declare and vindicate those 
fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship, and the 
enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the essential distinction 
between freedom and slavery.160 
 
C.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
 
Thereafter, and seeking to constitutionalize the 1866 legislation, a “partial, 
‘rump’ Congressdevoid of Southern representation—. . . proposed the Fourteenth 
Amendment”161 to the Constitution.162 As Confederate states’ readmission to the 
United States was conditioned on their ratification of the amendment,163 it has been 
                                                 
159 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982).  
160 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (emphasis added). 
161 Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and the Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1627, 1643 (2013). 
162 See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386 (1880) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment . . 
. secure[s] to the colored race, thereby invested with the rights, privileges, and 
responsibilities of citizenship, the enjoyment of all the civil rights that, under the law, are 
enjoyed by white persons . . . .”); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A 
BIOGRAPHY 381 (2005) (In proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress “aimed to 
provide an unimpeachable legal foundation” for the 1866 Civil Rights Act.); AKHIL REED 
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 187 (1998) (ebook) (Section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment “was consciously designed and widely understood to 
embrace” the Civil Rights Act of 1866); BERGER, supra note 50, at 32–33 (The Fourteenth 
Amendment “was designed to ‘constitutionalize’ the [1866 Civil Rights] Act . . . .”); John 
Harrison, Time, Change, and the Constitution, 90 VA. L. REV. 1601, 1606 (2004) (“The 
primary point of Section 1 [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was to constitutionalize a 
statutory ban on race discrimination, the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”).  
163 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. On the issue of the states’ ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, see also GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: 
JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 129–31 (2013) 
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remarked that the amendment was “forced down the throat of the southern political 
establishment”164 and “was ratified not by the collective assent of the American 
people, but rather at gunpoint.”165  
Officially adopted in 1868, Section 1 of the amendment provides: 
 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.166 
 
As can be seen, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment does not expressly prohibit 
racial classifications; a proposal to do so was made during the drafting process but 
was rejected.167 “Indeed, some Radical Republicans opposed ratification because 
they thought the amendment’s limited reach rendered it a party trick designed only 
for electioneering purposes.”168 Some Southerners “referred to the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the ‘negro equalization amendment,’ and were ‘terrified’ that it 
would . . .  someday be interpreted to preclude laws banning interracial marriage,” 
while compelling whites “to live on a level with the sickening stench of degraded 
humanity.”169  
What conduct was forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment? Three separate 
and distinct categories of rights were generally recognized in the Reconstruction era. 
Civil rights included “freedom of contract, property ownership, and court access—
rights guaranteed in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, for which the Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                 
(commenting on Congress’s possible response to the states’ refusal to ratify the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
164 Greene, supra note 146, at 1009. 
165 Colby, supra note 161, at 1629; see also WILLIAM D. WORKMAN, JR., THE CASE FOR 
THE SOUTH 14 (1960) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment was “adopted in . . . an 
uncivil, unrighteous and manifestly unconstitutional manner.”). 
166 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
167 The Congressional Joint Committee on Reconstruction considered but did not adopt 
the following language: “No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United 
States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.” MAGLIOCCA, supra note 163, at 121 (quoting BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, THE 
JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 296 (1914)). The 
Committee’s draft was not acceptable to Republicans who were “leery of seeming too 
attached to black interests” and “probably wanted to protect white unionists in the South 
from oppression by reconstructed state governments controlled by ex-Confederates.” 
Harrison, supra note 162, at 1606–07.  
168 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 18 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
169 Colby, supra note 161, at 1647 (citations omitted).  
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was designed to provide a secure constitutional foundation.”170 “All adult members 
of the political community possessed civil equality; that is what black males 
obtained when they became free.”171 “[P]olitical rights, such as voting or jury 
service,” were not enjoyed by all persons.172 “[P]eople could be civilly equal but not 
politically equal. Black men and unmarried women were civilly equal to white men 
but not politically equal.”173 Racial discrimination in voting was prohibited in the 
Fifteenth Amendment, two years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.174  
“[S]ocial rights, such as interracial marriage or school integration,” were 
resisted by many, including by Republicans.175 The concept of social equality had 
“a racially charged meaning” and was considered a “code word for miscegenation 
and racial intermarriage. The idea (or rather the fear) was that the relative status of 
blacks and whites as a group would be altered if society had a preponderance of 
mixed-race children, or if blacks and whites regarded themselves as members of the 
same family.”176 Thus, as Rebecca Scott observed, “[t]o conflate the phrase ‘social 
equality’ with an imagined taxonomy of civil, political, and social rights is to 
mistake an insult for an analytic exercise.”177 Social equality was “a label . . . 
enemies had long attempted to pin on the proponents of equal public rights in order 
to associate public rights with private intimacy and thereby to trigger the host of 
fears connected with the image of black men in physical proximity to white 
women.”178 With respect to public school education, African Americans “were 
almost universally excluded from, or segregated in, public schools when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.”179 The subject of infrequent discussion 
                                                 
170 KLARMAN, supra note 168, at 19; see also McConnell, supra note 14, at 961 n.48 
(noting an 1872 speech by Senator Lyman Trumbull in which Trumbull stated that the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 was confined to civil rights and did not apply to political or social rights). 
171 BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 116, at 144. 
172 KLARMAN, supra note 168, at 19. 
173 BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 116, at 144.  
174 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
175 KLARMAN, supra note 168, at 19; see also Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 
SUP. CT. REV. 303, 325 [hereinafter Klarman, The Plessy Era] (“Many northern Republicans 
in 1866 continued to resist the extension to blacks of either equal political rights, such as 
voting or jury service, or social rights, such as interracial marriage or school integration.”); 
Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1898 (1995) [hereinafter Klarman, Brown, 
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory] (Section 1 of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment 
“was consistently defended in public debate—both in Congress and in the constituencies—
as a guarantee of civil, not political or social, rights.”). 
176 BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 116, at 145 (citation omitted). 
177 Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality, and the Conceptual Roots of the 
Plessy Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777, 781 (2008). 
178 Id.; see also McConnell, supra note 14, at 1018 (“A significant undercurrent in the 
discussion of social rights was the fear that intermixing would lead to miscegenation, and 
that the theory of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . would logically extend to a right of racial 
intermarriage.”). 
179 KLARMAN, supra note 168, at 19. 
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during the 1866 debates over the amendment, Democrats argued and Republicans 
denied that the provision would protect a social right to compulsory school 
integration.180 In sum, Reconstruction-era legal thought did not envisage 
governmental guarantee of social rights.181 
The Reconstruction-era taxonomy of rights is recognized in Jack Balkin’s 
“tripartite theory of citizenship.”182 He notes that “the key point of the tripartite 
theory was that equal citizenship and equality before the law meant something less 
than it does for us today: civil equality, but not political or social equality.”183 This 
understanding of the rights protected and not protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment is consistent with the fact that at the time of the amendment’s adoption, 
the Framers and ratifiers (including a number of Republicans) “did not want to give 
blacks the right to vote and . . . did not want to challenge state laws banning 
interracial marriage; to do so in 1866 would have been politically explosive.”184  
Further evidence and confirmation of the existence and recognition of the civil-
political-social-rights trichotomy is found in Plessy v. Ferguson.185 As one of the 
                                                 
180 Id.  
181 See Mark Tushnet, Contemporary Issues of Race Relations, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 699, 
700–01 (1993); see also GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE SHADOW OF SLAVERY: 
THE CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, at 11 (2013) 
(“Consistent with the understanding of civil rights at the time, the act stopped well short of 
protecting full participation in public life. It did not protect political rights, such as the right 
to vote, or social rights, such as the right to marry.” (citation omitted)); Eric Foner, The 
Original Intent of the Fourteenth Amendment: A Conversation with Eric Foner, 6 NEV. L.J. 
425, 438 (2006) (“Nobody who was talking about the Fourteenth Amendment except Charles 
Sumner believed in social equality. Social equality tended to mean intermarriage between 
black and white. . . . Social equality was for individuals; the state could not mandate.”); 
Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 291 (1998) 
(“Through most of Reconstruction and the years that followed, it was generally understood 
that blacks were constitutionally entitled to the same civil rights as whites but not necessarily 
to the same social and political rights.”); Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice, 80 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 29 (2011) (during the Reconstruction era “courts assessed the 
constitutionality of antidiscrimination laws by determining whether such laws conferred 
civil, political, and social rights.”); Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 
791, 792 (1996) (“The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment said repeatedly that the 
Amendment was intended to protect civil rights, but not political or social rights.”); Mark 
Tushnet, Civil Rights and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction Amendments, 25 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1207, 1208–09 (1992) (the Fourteenth Amendment protected civil but not 
social rights). 
182 BALKIN, supra note 41, at 222.  
183 Id. at 222–23; see also McConnell, supra note 14, at 1016 (“The ‘social rights’ 
argument was based on a tripartite division of rights, universally accepted at the time but 
forgotten today, between civil rights, political rights, and social rights.”); id. at 1024 (“It was 
generally understood that the nondiscrimination requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment 
applied only to ‘civil rights.’ Political and social rights, it was agreed, were not civil rights 
and were not protected.”). 
184 BALKIN, supra note 41, at 223. 
185 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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cases in the American anti-canon,186 Plessy rejected an equal protection challenge to 
Louisiana’s Separate Car Law mandating “equal but separate accommodations for 
the white, and the colored races.”187 Speaking for the Court, Justice Henry Billings 
Brown determined that the law was a reasonable regulation, with the “question of 
reasonableness” answered by the state’s “liberty to act with reference to the 
established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the 
promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and good 
order.”188 
Of special interest is the Court’s construction of the Equal Protection Clause. 
In Justice Brown’s view, the mandate that the state shall not deny to any person the 
equal protection of the laws was not “intended to abolish distinctions based upon 
color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political[,] equality, or a 
commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”189 Laws 
mandating the separation of blacks and whites did “not necessarily imply the 
inferiority of either race to the other,” and “the establishment of separate schools for 
white and colored children . . . has been held to be a valid exercise of the legislative 
power even by courts of States where the political rights of the colored race have 
been longest and most earnestly enforced.”190 And “[l]aws forbidding the 
intermarriage of the two races may be said in a technical sense to interfere with the 
freedom to contract, and yet have been universally recognized as within the police 
power of the State.”191 
In addition, Justice Brown found flawed the assumption that social prejudices 
can be overcome by legislation: “If the two races are to meet upon terms of social 
equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each 
other’s merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.”192 Expressly distinguishing 
between civil, political, and social rights, he concluded: “If the civil and political 
rights of both races be equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. 
If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United States 
cannot put them upon the same plane.”193  
The sole dissenter in Plessy, Justice John Marshall Harlan, opined, “[e]very one 
knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to 
exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored 
people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.”194 The “real 
meaning” of the at-issue law was to ensure that “inferior and degraded” African 
                                                 
186 See Akhil Reed Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 
76 (2011); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011). 
187 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540 (quoting 1890 La. Acts 152). 
188 Id. at 550. 
189 Id. at 544 (emphasis added). 
190 Id.  
191 Id. at 545. 
192 Id. at 551 (emphasis added). 
193 Id. at 551–52 (emphasis added). 
194 Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
2015] BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1171 
Americans could not sit in public coaches with whites.195 Justice Harlan viewed the 
railway car segregation mandated by the Separate Car Law as the denial of a civil 
right and “a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the 
equality before the law established by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon 
any legal grounds.”196  
Notably, Justice Harlan (who had owned slaves and opposed the Emancipation 
Proclamation, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Freedmen’s Bureau)197 did not 
endorse or argue for the protection of African Americans’ social equality: 
 
[S]ocial equality no more exists between two races when travelling in a 
passenger coach or a public highway than when members of the same 
races sit by each other in a street car or in the jury box, or stand or sit with 
each other in a political assembly, or when they use in common the streets 
of a city or town, or when they are in the same room for the purpose of 
having their names placed on the registry of voters, or when they approach 
the ballot-box in order to exercise the high privilege of voting.198 
 
Justice Harlan’s dissent also set forth his metaphoric conception of the Constitution. 
In a passage preceded by language endorsing the racial superiority of whites,199 he 
stated: “[I]n view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country 
no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our 
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens.”200 That he was referring only to civil rights was made clear:  
 
In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest 
is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes 
no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as 
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.201  
 
To reiterate, Justice Harlan’s equal protection analysis reflects the reality that 
at the time of its adoption, it was understood that the Fourteenth Amendment 
                                                 
195 Id. at 560. 
196 Id. at 562. 
197 See Ronald Turner, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia’s Originalist Defense of 
Brown v. Board of Education, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 170, 183 (2014). 
198 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
199 Justice Harlan made clear his view that “[t]he white race deems itself to be the 
dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in 
wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to 
its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty.” Id. at 559. Justice 
Harlan thus recognized and endorsed “white superiority in the very paragraph in which he 
proclaimed fealty to colorblindness.” Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, 
Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 993 (2007). 
200 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
201 Id. (emphasis added). 
 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO.5 1172
protected civil but not social rights.202 This understanding of the protective scope of 
the clause is also evidenced by the Court’s pre-Plessy decision in Pace v. 
Alabama.203 In Pace, Justice Harlan joined the Court’s decision and holding that a 
state criminal law’s penalty enhancement for adultery and fornication engaged in by 
black-white couples did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.204 The Court 
reasoned that punishing different-race couples more harshly than same-race couples 
engaging in the same conduct did not violate the clause because the more severe 
punishment was “directed against the offence designated and not against the person 
of any particular color or race. The punishment of each offending person, whether 
white or black, is the same.”205 Pace thus preserved “[c]ivil equality . . . because 
members of each race were subject to the same punishments if they slept with 
persons of a different race, and securing social equality was not a proper concern of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”206 Moreover, in cases decided after Plessy, Justice 
Harlan joined the Court’s ruling upholding a racially discriminatory poll tax207 and 
wrote the Court’s opinion rejecting an equal protection challenge to a separate-but-
unequal scheme involving a school board’s closing of an all-black high school and 
continued operation of a high school for whites.208  
 
* * * 
 
The foregoing and necessarily brief discussion of certain aspects of this 
nation’s history of white supremacy and racial hierarchy is presented to provide a 
factual and legal backdrop and context relevant to the consideration of the political 
and intellectual atmosphere and beliefs, attitudes, and prejudices extant at the time 
of the proposed and ratified Fourteenth Amendment. That exercise requires 
reference to and recognition of mid-nineteenth century facts and racial/racist 
realities. An informed and unflinching recognition of American apartheid’s racist 
regime and the subordinating practices of that time is essential to an accurate 
reporting of life in that deeply racist era. “For the intellectual elite of the late 
nineteenth century,” racism was “a feature of reality. . . . Racism constituted how 
people saw the world—how normal people saw the world. To deny or question 
racism didn’t make you curious, or clever. To deny it made you weird.”209  
                                                 
202 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public 
Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1211–12 (2014) (In Plessy, “Justice Harlan’s 
dissent agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment did not reach inequalities in social rights. His 
disagreement with the Court rested on his conclusion that railroad segregation implicated 
civil, rather than social, equality.” (citation omitted)). 
203 106 U.S. 583 (1882), overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
204 Id. at 584–85; see Turner, supra note 197, at 182. 
205 Pace, 106 U.S. at 585. 
206 BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 116, at 145. 
207 See Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898). 
208 See Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899); 
KLARMAN, supra note 168, at 45. 
209 Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1421 (1997). 
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Was that world one in which the Fourteenth Amendment recognized and 
protected black children’s social right to a desegregated public school education?  
 
IV.  BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
 
Was state-mandated racial segregation in public schools prohibited by the 
Fourteenth Amendment? This Part examines Brown v. Board of Education, a case 
about the social right to education,210 and the Supreme Court’s 1954 invalidation of 
state-mandated racial segregation in public schools. In addition, post-Brown actions 
by supporters of the segregationist status quo are considered, including originalist 
arguments made by United States Senators and Representatives in their “Southern 
Manifesto” opposing the Court’s decision. 
 
A.  The Segregationist and Originalist Defense 
 
In December 1952, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in the Segregation 
Cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware wherein the lower 
courts rejected Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state-mandated racial 
segregation in public schools.211 John W. Davis, counsel for the school board in the 
South Carolina case, addressed “the condition of those who framed” the Fourteenth 
Amendment.212 He noted that “the same Congress” that proposed the amendment in 
June 1866 proceeded in July 1866 “to establish or to continue separate schools in 
the District of Columbia.”213 Turning to the states, Davis advised the Court that thirty 
of the thirty-seven states of the union ratified the Fourteenth Amendment; of those 
ratifying states, twenty-three had or immediately installed racially segregated public 
schools.214 “Were they violating the Amendment which they had solemnly 
accepted?,” Davis asked the Court.215 “Were they conceiving of it in any other sense 
than that it did not touch their power over their public schools?”216 
In the Court’s post-argument conference, Chief Justice Fred Moore Vinson 
expressed his view that “the Plessy case was right . . . .”217 Justice William O. 
                                                 
210 See Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1537, 1570 (2004). 
211 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.1 (1954). 
212 Oral Argument, Briggs v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), rev’d sub nom. Brown v. Bd. 
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reprinted in 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 331 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS]. 
213 Id. 
214 See id. at 333. 
215 Id.  
216 Id. Davis argued that as of 1952 seventeen states provided for racially segregated 
schools and that four states permitted school boards to segregate black and white students. 
Id.  
217 MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE 
SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 187 (1994).  
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Douglas believed that “if the cases were to be then decided the vote would be five 
to four in favor of the constitutionality of segregation in the public schools in the 
States . . . .”218 When Justice Felix Frankfurter persuaded his colleagues that the 
cases should be reargued the following Term, the Court ordered reargument and 
asked the parties to address several questions, including this query: “What evidence 
is there that the Congress which submitted and the State legislatures and conventions 
which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, 
understood or did not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public 
schools?”219 
Appearing at the December 1953 reargument,220 John W. Davis addressed the 
Court’s question regarding congressional and ratifiers’ understandings as to whether 
the Fourteenth Amendment would abolish racially segregated schools.221 Davis 
reiterated the count-the-states argument he made to the Court a year earlier222 and 
contended that a study of legislation by Congress before, after, and during the time 
period in which the amendment was discussed made clear that “Congress did not 
intend by the Fourteenth Amendment to deal with the question of mixed or 
segregated schools.”223 Moreover, Davis continued, the Freedmen’s Bureau 
established by the same Congress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment 
established racially separate schools throughout the South.224 He argued, in addition, 
that during the House of Representatives’ consideration of the bill that would 
become the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the complaint was made that the legislation 
“would do away with the separate schools.”225 Responding to that assertion, 
Representative James Wilson, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, “said 
on the floor that the Act did not mean that their children should attend the same 
school, and, in effect, that it was absurd so to interpret it.”226  
  
                                                 
218 Id.; see THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE 
DISCUSSIONS BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 661 (Del Dickson ed., 
2001). 
219 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972, 972 (1953) (per curiam). 
220 Prior to the reargument, Chief Justice Vinson suffered a fatal heart attack and was 
replaced on the Court by Earl Warren. See JIM NEWTON, JUSTICE FOR ALL: EARL WARREN 
AND THE NATION HE MADE 256 (2006). Upon learning of Chief Justice Vinson’s death, 
Justice Frankfurter reportedly said, “This is the first indication that I have ever had that there 
is a God.” BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—
A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 72 (1983). 
221 49A LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS, supra note 212, at 479, 481. 
222 Id. at 481. 
223 Id. at 482. 
224 Id. at 484. 
225 Id. at 485. 
226 Id.  
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B.  The Court’s Decision 
 
On May 17, 1954, a unanimous Court issued its nonoriginalist, if not 
antioriginalist, decision.227 Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren noted 
that the 1953 reargument “was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868,” and “covered exhaustively 
consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the states, then existing 
practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents and opponents of the 
Amendment.”228 While “these sources cast some light,” the Chief Justice stated, “it 
is not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are 
inconclusive.”229 This conclusion is certainly questionable. “It was unclear, to say 
the least, that the framers or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment had intended the 
equal protection clause to prevent racially segregated public [school] education.”230 
Alexander Bickel, one of Justice Frankfurter’s law clerks, published an article in 
1955 in which he concluded that “the immediate objectives to which section I of the 
fourteenth amendment was addressed . . . was not expected in 1866 to apply to 
segregation.”231  
                                                 
227 See CROSS, supra note 13, at 92 (asserting that “Brown [is] functionally an 
antioriginalist opinion.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 198 (2013) 
(concluding that Brown is a nonoriginalist decision). 
228 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). 
229 Id. Chief Justice Warren opined that the proponents of the post-Civil War 
amendments “intended them to remove all legal distinctions among ‘all persons born or 
naturalized in the United States,’” while opponents “were antagonistic to both the letter and 
the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited [legal] effect. What 
others in Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any 
degree of certainty.” Id. In addition, he determined that at the time of the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment the free public school movement “had not yet taken hold” and that 
education of black persons “was almost nonexistent” and was “forbidden by law in some 
states.” Id. at 490. Given that record, he was not surprised that there was “little in the history 
of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.” Id.  
230 RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 62 (1995). 
231 Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 
69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 64 (1955); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 100 (1962) (“Was it the intention 
of the framers of that Amendment—the Reconstruction 39th Congress—to forbid the states 
to enact and enforce segregation statutes? . . . The framers did not intend or expect then and 
there to outlaw segregation, which, of course, was a practice widely prevalent in the North.”); 
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 156 (1999) (“[T]he 
very Congress that submitted the Fourteenth Amendment to the states for ratification also 
supported segregated schools in the District of Columbia” and the Amendment’s supporters 
gave assurances that the Amendment would not require racially integrated schools.); Michael 
Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252 
(1991) (“Evidence regarding the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
ambiguous as to a wide variety of issues, but not school segregation. Virtually nothing in the 
congressional debates suggests that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit 
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Looking to the Court’s initial Fourteenth Amendment decisions, Chief Justice 
Warren observed that the Court interpreted the amendment “as proscribing all state-
imposed discriminations against the Negro race,”232 and that the separate-but-equal 
doctrine did not appear in the Court until the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson decision 
involving racial segregation in public transportation.233 The Chief Justice opined that 
“we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even 
to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”234 Focusing instead on “public 
education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life 
throughout the Nation,”235 he formulated a then-present-day approach to the issue 
before the Court: 
 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local 
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great 
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the 
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the 
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a 
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing 
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally 
to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may 
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of 
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.236 
 
Chief Justice Warren then asked and answered in the affirmative the question 
of whether segregating children by race deprived children of color of equal 
educational opportunities, even though physical facilities and other tangible factors 
were “equal.”237 Noting that the Court had considered intangible considerations in 
invalidating segregated education in the professional school setting,238 he 
determined that:  
                                                 
school segregation, while contemporaneous state practices render such an interpretation 
fanciful . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
232 Brown, 347 U.S. at 490, 490 n.5 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 
(1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); The 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)). 
233 See id. at 490–91. 
234 Id. at 492. 
235 Id. at 492−93. 
236 Id. at 493. 
237 Id. 
238 See McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 641–42 
(1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634–37 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 
of Okla., 332 U.S. 631, 632–33 (1948) (per curiam). David Strauss argues that in relying on 
these higher education cases the Brown Court completed an evolutionary “common law 
process.” STRAUSS, supra note 19, at 92. 
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Such considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high 
schools. To separate them from others of similar age and qualifications 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.239  
 
“Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of 
Plessy v. Ferguson,” the finding that racial segregation in public schools has a 
detrimental effect upon children of color “is amply supported by modern authority. 
Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.”240 
Having rejected certain language in but not expressly overruling Plessy,241 
Chief Justice Warren declared “that in the field of public education the doctrine of 
‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal.”242 Accordingly, the plaintiffs and other similarly situated persons had been 
“deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”243  
 
C.  Post-Brown Developments 
 
Supporters of the pre-Brown segregationist status quo responded to Brown. In 
March 1956, virtually all United States Senators and Representatives from southern 
states issued a “Declaration of Constitutional Principles,” also known as the 
“Southern Manifesto.”244 Drafted by Senators Strom Thurmond, Sam Ervin, Harry 
Byrd, Richard Russell and others,245 the manifesto proclaimed that the Founding 
Fathers “framed this Constitution with its provisions for change by amendment in 
                                                 
239 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. 
240 Id. at 494−95 (citation omitted). Footnote 11 to the “modern authority” text of the 
Court’s opinion cited social science studies, including Dr. Kenneth Clark’s doll test. See id. 
at 494 n.11. For more on footnote 11, see ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION? 
A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 13−15 (1996); Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of 
Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279, 292−96 (2005). 
241 David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J 1065, 
1070 (2008) (“Brown did not formally overrule Plessy, [but] it squarely . . . [addressed] the 
claim, central to Plessy, that segregation did not necessarily denote inferiority.”). Segregated 
public transportation was subsequently held unconstitutional in Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 
903, 903 (1956) (mem.) (per curiam), aff’g 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956). 
242 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495. 
243 Id. 
244 See 102 CONG. REC. 4459–61 (1956) (statement of Sen. George); id. at 5445 
(statement of Sen. Thurmond). Only three southern senators—Albert Gore and Estes 
Kefauver of Tennessee and Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas—did not sign the manifesto. Justin 
Driver, Supremacies and the Southern Manifesto, 92 TEX. L. REV 1053, 1079 (2014). 
245 See KARL E. CAMPBELL, SENATOR SAM ERVIN, LAST OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 
105−07 (2007); ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE 
SENATE 785 (2002). 
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order to secure the fundamentals of government against the dangers of temporary 
popular passion or the personal predilections of public officeholders.”246 The 
manifesto regarded Brown as “a clear abuse of judicial power” and the culmination 
of a trend of federal court legislation “in derogation of the authority of Congress” 
that “encroach[ed] upon the reserved rights of the States and the people.”247 This 
“unwarranted decision of the Supreme Court in the public school cases is now 
bearing the fruit always produced when men substitute naked power for established 
law.”248  
Consider the manifesto’s originalist critique of Brown: 
 
The original Constitution does not mention education. Neither does the 
14th amendment nor any other amendment. The debates preceding the 
submission of the 14th amendment clearly show that there was no intent 
that it should affect the system of education maintained by the States. 
The very Congress which proposed the amendment subsequently 
provided for segregated schools in the District of Columbia. 
When the amendment was adopted in 1868, there were 37 States of 
the Union. Every one of the 26 states that had any substantial racial 
differences among its people . . . either approved the operation of 
segregated schools already in existence or subsequently established such 
schools by action of the same law-making body which considered the 14th 
amendment.249 
 
The manifesto also approvingly referred to Plessy v. Ferguson, stating that the 
Court’s validation of the separate-but-equal doctrine  
 
became a part of the life of the people of many of the States and confirmed 
their habits, customs, traditions, and way of life. It is founded on elemental 
humanity and commonsense, for parents should not be deprived by 
Government of the right to direct the lives and education of their own 
children.250  
 
The manifesto’s critique of Brown “placed in the foreground precisely the 
argument that the Court’s opinion . . . sought to force into the background.”251 For 
the manifesto’s authors, the states’ power to segregate children on the basis of race 
was consistent with the original and established law of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.252 Brown’s “naked power” grab did what the manifesto authors would 
                                                 
246 102 CONG. REC. 4460 (1956). 
247 Id.  
248 Id.  
249 Id. 
250 Id. 
251 Driver, supra note 244, at 1063. 
252 Id. (“The Manifesto’s central critique asserted that the decision violated the original 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
2015] BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 1179 
not have done: formally interred a significant component and manifestation of Jim 
and Jane Crow’s white-supremacist racial hierarchy and subordination. 
Other opponents of Brown turned to state legislatures in Alabama, Georgia, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia and obtained declarations that the Court’s 
decision was null and void.253 The employment of Georgia state officers who refused 
to enforce that state’s segregation laws could be terminated.254 Virginia announced 
that it would employ “all ‘honorabl[e], legal[ ] and constitutional[ ]’ means to ‘resist 
this illegal encroachment upon our sovereign powers.’”255  
Individuals seeking to integrate public schools experienced resistance. For 
instance, in 1957, the Arkansas National Guard carried out the orders of Governor 
Orval Faubus and prevented the enrollment of nine African American students at the 
Little Rock Central High School.256 Although he sympathized with Southerners 
concerned that their “sweet little girls [would] be seated alongside some big 
overgrown Negroes,”257 President Dwight D. Eisenhower dispatched one thousand 
soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock to restore order and allow 
the students to enroll.258 In 1960, federal marshals escorted six-year-old Ruby 
Bridges past an egg- and tomato-throwing crowd and into the William Frantz 
Elementary School in New Orleans, Louisiana (an event depicted in Norman 
Rockwell’s famous “The Problem We All Live With” painting).259 She was the first 




As set forth in this Part, an originalist argument in defense of the separate-but-
equal doctrine in the context of public education was in fact made to the Supreme 
Court in the Brown argument and reargument. Deciding the case on the basis of its 
view of the role and dynamics of public education circa 1954, the Court did not look 
to the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment or to Plessy’s late-
nineteenth-century validation of Louisiana’s apartheidic separation and 
subordination of African Americans. Stridently opposed by those favoring the 
                                                 
253 Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South During 
the Decade After Brown, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 92, 93 (1994); Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther 
King’s Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 
1014 n.93 (1989). 
254 See Kennedy, supra note 253, at 1014. 
255 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 60 (2000) 
(quoting S.J. Res. 3, 1956 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 1956 Va. Acts 1213, 1215). 
256 See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954–
63, at 222 (1988). 
257 EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 291 (1977) 
(quoting Eisenhower). 
258 BRANCH, supra note 256, at 224. 
259 See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW 
ORLEANS, AND THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST 257 (2006). 
260 Id. 
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segregationist status quo and pressing an originalist critique of its decision, the 
Court’s nonoriginalist, if not antioriginalist, decision holds an exalted place in the 
nation’s constitutional law canon.  
 
V.  DISCRETIONARY ORIGINALISM AND BROWN 
 
Can Brown be squared with originalism? Over the years, originalist scholars 
asking this question have engaged in one or more aspects of discretionary 
originalism. They have chosen originalism over other available methodologies; 
selected a particular originalist methodology from among a menu of originalist 
theories; framed the inquiry and defined the level of generality at which the claimed 
right to a desegregated public school education should be characterized; and 
determined the parameters of the evidentiary inquiry relevant to the issue addressed 
in Brown. While a few originalists have concluded that Brown was wrongly decided, 
more advocates of the methodology have reached the opposite conclusion. In doing 
so, they employed varying conceptions and theories of originalism and made 
discretionary interpretive and analytical moves en route to their determination that 
the result in Brown can be squared with originalism. That discretionary originalism 
is discussed in this Part. 
 
A.  Original-Intent Originalism 
 
In Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Raoul Berger examined the “sacred cow of modern constitutional law, 
Brown v. Board of Education.”261 Berger believed that Brown was “a long overdue 
attempt to rectify the grievous wrongs done to the blacks.”262 He did not believe, 
however, that the Fourteenth Amendment authorized the Supreme Court to outlaw 
racial segregation in public schools.263  
Berger noted that “Congress . . . permitted segregated schools in the District of 
Columbia from 1864 onward” and had refused to abolish such schools.264 “How can 
it be maintained that Congress, after steadfastly refusing to abolish segregated 
schools in the District, . . . would cram desegregation down the throats of the 
States?”265 Black students, “still widely regarded as ‘racially inferior’ and ‘incapable 
of education,’” could not attend public schools in the North, Berger stated.266 And a 
proposal to ban segregated schools in the North “was far from the framers’ minds,” 
for “such interference with state control of internal affairs would have imperiled 
                                                 
261 BERGER, supra note 50, at 25. 
262 Id. at 132. 
263 See infra notes 264–272. 
264 BERGER, supra note 50, at 26 (quoting RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 635 
(1976)). 
265 Id. 
266 Id. (quoting HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION 290 n.70 (1968)); 
see also id. at 152 (“Segregated schools were deeply entrenched in the North.”). 
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enactment and adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.”267 In fact, Berger observed, 
House Judiciary Committee Chairman James Wilson gave his “assurance that the 
parallel Civil Rights Bill—regarded as ‘identical’ with the Fourteenth Amendment 
. . .—did not require” desegregated schools.268  
Berger found additional evidence that the Framers did not intend to prohibit 
school segregation in the fact that at the time of the proposal of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Senate gallery was segregated,269 and a post-amendment-adoption 
effort by Charles Sumner to move a supplemental bill requiring a provision for 
nondiscriminatory public schools in state constitutions failed.270 Accordingly, “the 
‘imperfect’ ‘understanding of equal protection’ in 1866 means that the framers did 
not conceive it in the vastly broadened terms given to the phrase by the Warren 
Court.”271 It was not necessary to refer to such segregation in the amendment’s text 
“because confessedly no one then imagined that the equal protection clause might 
affect school segregation. Why provide against the unimagined?”272 On Berger’s 
view and application of original intent originalism, Brown was wrongly decided. 
Another scholar, Earl Maltz, has argued that the originalist case against Brown 
is grounded in the view that “a direct constitutional attack on segregated schools was 
unthinkable in the period in which the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, passed, 
and ratified.”273 Maltz observed that school segregation was common in the northern 
states and was prevalent in the lower northern states during the time in which the 
amendment was considered.274 “Thus, any direct, broad-based effort to attack 
segregated schools would have carried with it substantial political risks.”275 The 
Fourteenth Amendment was crafted to appeal to swing voters, and mainstream 
Republicans assured voters that the amendment’s impact on the laws of northern 
states would be minimal, “a claim they could not make if Section 1 had been 
generally understood to outlaw segregated schools.”276 Like Berger, Maltz 
determined that congressional unwillingness to abolish segregated schools in the 
District of Columbia suggested that the Framers did not intend to prohibit 
segregation in the public schools.277  
                                                 
267 Id. at 26. 
268 Id. at 26−27. 
269 Id. at 139. 
270 Id. at 140. 
271 Id. at 141. 
272 Id. at 151 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
273 Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions—A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 228 (1996).  
274 Id.  
275 Id. 
276 Id. at 228–29; see also Earl M. Maltz, A Dissenting Opinion to Brown, 20 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 93, 94 (1995) (The Fourteenth Amendment “was in large measure a campaign document, 
designed to outline the Republican program of Reconstruction for the upcoming election of 
1866.”). 
277 See Maltz, supra note 273, at 229. 
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Consider Robert Bork’s original-intent analysis of Brown. In Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,278 he urged that a court deciding 
the issue before the Brown Court would identify two facts.279 Fact 1: “[T]he men 
who put the amendment in the Constitution intended that the Supreme Court should 
secure against government action some large measure of racial equality. That is 
certainly the core meaning of the amendment.”280 Fact 2: “[T]hose same men were 
not agreed about what the concept of racial equality requires.”281 
What was the intent of those men? Bork stated that some believed “that blacks 
were entitled to purchase property from any willing seller but not to attend integrated 
schools, or that they were entitled to serve on juries but not to intermarry with whites, 
or that they were entitled to equal physical facilities but that the facilities should be 
separate.”282 He asserted that the Brown Court could not “know how these long-dead 
men” would have voted on these issues, but did know that the amendment “was 
intended to enforce a core idea of black equality against governmental 
discrimination.”283 Contending that the Court could not require equality in some but 
not other cases, Bork concluded that the Court had to “choose a general principle of 
equality that applie[d] to all cases.”284 For Bork, that (his) equality principle justified 
the Court’s choice of a no-segregation rule over Plessy’s separate-but-equal 
doctrine.285  
As can be seen, Bork made two discretionary and outcome-influential 
interpretive moves. First, he noted but set to the side the pro-segregation views of 
the aforementioned long-dead men who amended the Constitution. Second, Bork’s 
formulation of a core ideal of black equality is the foundation for his conclusion that 
school segregation violated the Equal Protection Clause. Bork’s conclusion that 
Brown was rightly decided was reached via a (his) theory of black equality, 
concededly not recognized by, and certainly not consistent with, the intent of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Framers. And his determination that the Framers intended 
to secure an undefined large measure of equality expands the protective scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment beyond that provision’s civil rights focus. 
 
B.  Original-Understanding Originalism 
 
Years later, Bork moved from original intent to original-understanding 
originalism in his book The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the 
Law.286 He argued that the “inescapable fact is that those who ratified the amendment 
did not think it outlawed segregated education or segregation in any aspect of 
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life.”287 Bork also assumed that Plessy v. Ferguson correctly represented the original 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, “that equality and state-compelled 
separation of the races were consistent.”288 He supposed, in addition, that the 
amendment’s ratifiers did not object to the psychological harm suffered by those 
subjected to segregation.289 “If those things are true, then it is impossible to square 
the opinion in Brown with the original understanding.”290  
Notwithstanding these observations, Bork concluded that Brown’s result “is 
consistent with, indeed is compelled by, the original understanding” of the Equal 
Protection Clause.291 Consider his result-squaring argument. When the Court 
decided Brown in 1954, “it had been apparent for some time that segregation rarely 
if ever produced equality.” Thus, the Court faced “a situation in which the courts 
would have to go on forever entertaining litigation about primary schools, secondary 
schools, colleges, washrooms, golf courses, swimming pools, drinking fountains, 
and the endless variety of facilities that were segregated, or else the separate-but-
equal doctrine would have to be abandoned.”292 Bork believed that the Court had to 
choose between two “mutually inconsistent” options: (1) allow segregation and 
“abandon the quest for equality” or (2) “forbid segregation in order to achieve 
equality.”293 For Bork, the choice was clear—“the Court must choose equality and 
prohibit state-imposed segregation. The purpose that brought the fourteenth 
amendment into being was equality before the law, and equality, not separation, was 
written into the text.”294 An opinion in Brown based on this approach “would have 
clearly been rooted in the original understanding, and its legitimacy would have been 
enhanced for those troubled by the way in which the Court arrived at a moral result 
without demonstrating its mooring in the historic Constitution.”295 
Bork’s framing and choice of equality over state-imposed segregation is neither 
obvious nor compelled. The word “equality” is not found in the text of the Equal 
Protection Clause;296 nor is a ban on racial separation.297 Yet, as he did in 1971, Bork 
formulated and applied his own concept of equality grounded in his own value-
partial view298 of the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose. This discretionary move is 
especially questionable given facts and history demonstrating that “segregation was 
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not necessarily contrary to this nation’s notion of equality” circa 1866–1868299 (as 
Bork concedes), and that the amendment did not address or protect the social rights 
of black children.300 Bork’s discretionary originalism is grounded, not in the 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratifiers, but in his own 
nonoriginalist assumptions, premises, and preferences. His conclusion that Brown’s 
result is consistent with and compelled by the original understanding of the Equal 
Protection Clause is thus fundamentally flawed and egregiously incorrect. 
Another constitutional theorist, Michael Perry, argues that Brown was correctly 
decided.301 For Perry, the “originalist approach correctly understood” asks “the 
fundamental question about the meaning of a provision of the constitutional text . . 
.: What directive (or directives) did the people—or those who represented them, in 
particular the ratifiers—understand the provision to communicate; what directive 
does the provision, as originally understood, represent?”302 The state action at issue 
in Brown implicates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
Perry submits; that provision refers, among other things, to the fundamental right to 
liberty and to basic rights of property and contract.303 The clause “protects, by its 
very terms, not merely some of the privileges and immunities enjoyed by citizens 
under state law, but all of them.”304 Therefore, he concluded, state provision of a free 
public education to white citizens cannot constitutionally be denied to nonwhite 
citizens.305 “Unquestionably, then, the state laws at issue in Brown violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . [T]hey violated the directive represented by the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause as that clause was originally understood.”306  
Is Perry correct? While his argument that the terms of the clause can be read as 
protecting all and not some privileges or immunities is a plausible one, evaluating 
that position as an originalist matter is difficult given the absence of facts and 
specific evidence supporting his conclusion that the ratifiers understood that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause mandated the invalidation of school segregation. 
The absence of such evidence is of critical significance, for the question remains 
whether Perry’s approach can be squared with the Reconstruction-era view that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protected civil but not social rights.307 Does he dispute that 
era’s taxonomy of rights? Did the ratifiers hold or not hold this view? What facts 
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and evidence must one consider and evaluate in determining an, or the, answer to 
this question? Conclusory assertions are no substitute for a rigorous and evidence-
based originalist analysis of the school segregation question. 
 
C.  Original Public Meaning Originalism 
 
Original public meaning originalists have also argued and concluded that 
Brown is an originalist decision. This section provides an overview of the following 
advocates of this view: Justice Scalia, Michael McConnell, Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Steven Calabresi, and Michael Perl. 
What has Justice Scalia, a prominent advocate of original public meaning 
originalism, said about Brown? Recall that the Justice has made clear that he looks 
for the original and most plausible meaning of constitutional text to the adopting 
society.308 He has also instructed that those searching for that meaning must immerse 
themselves “in the political and intellectual atmosphere of the time.”309  
With regard to Brown, Justice Scalia has argued in a dissenting opinion that 
“the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement of ‘equal protection of the laws,’ 
combined with the Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of the institution of black 
slavery, leaves no room for doubt that laws treating people differently because of 
their race are invalid.”310 He stated further that “even if one does not regard the 
Fourteenth Amendment as crystal clear on this point, a tradition of unchallenged 
validity did not exist with respect to the practice in Brown,”311 as the separate-but-
equal doctrine was challenged as unconstitutional and upheld by the Supreme Court 
in Plessy v. Ferguson over the dissent of Justice Harlan.312 
Justice Scalia’s analysis is a notable illustration of discretionary originalism. 
His argument that the Equal Protection Clause is “crystal clear” and unambiguously 
prohibits segregation rests on his reading of the text of the Equal Protection Clause 
and the Thirteenth Amendment and his view of the significance of Homer Plessy’s 
challenge to the separate-but-equal doctrine rejected by the Court twenty-eight years 
after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. That an original public circa 1866–
1868 would have agreed with Justice Scalia’s interpretation is a doubtful and frankly 
incredible proposition. What is obvious and crystal clear to him is not indisputably 
obvious at all. And how does the Plessy decision issued twenty-eight years after the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment—a seven-to-one decision validating the 
separate-but-equal doctrine—in any way demonstrate or even suggest that the 
original public meaning of the amendment prohibited school segregation?  
More recently, in his book Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts,313 
Justice Scalia and his coauthor Bryan Garner submit that a “frequent line of attack 
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against originalism consists in appeal to popular Supreme Court decisions that are 
assertedly based on a rejection of original meaning.”314 The authors refer to Brown 
as the most cited example of the view that “only nonoriginalism could have produced 
. . . generally acclaimed results.”315 This is not so, Justice Scalia and Garner contend, 
for the text of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause “can reasonably be thought to prohibit all laws designed to assert 
the separateness and superiority of the white race, even those that purport to treat 
the races equally. Justice John Marshall Harlan took this position in his powerful 
(and thoroughly originalist) dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson.”316 
The characterization of Justice Harlan’s Plessy dissent as in any way, let alone 
thoroughly, originalist and supportive of the result in Brown is dubious. Recall that 
while Justice Harlan argued that the challenged separate-but-equal law in Plessy 
unconstitutionally violated an African American’s civil rights,317 neither he nor the 
Plessy majority departed from or rejected the Reconstruction-era division of rights 
into civil, political, and social categories.318 An interpreter who subscribed to that 
trichotomy approach could consistently and simultaneously determine that the 
Fourteenth Amendment (1) required the invalidation of the separate-but-equal 
doctrine as applied to the civil right to desegregated public transportation (as did 
Justice Harlan, but not the Plessy majority) and (2) did not require the invalidation 
of state laws mandating racial segregation as applied to the claimed social right to 
attend desegregated public schools. Thus, Justice Harlan’s civil-rights-focused 
Plessy dissent in no way supports the constitutional recognition of a social right to 
attend a racially integrated public school. Failure to comprehend and adhere to the 
Reconstruction-era taxonomy of rights attributes to Justice Harlan views he did not 
hold, and invoking Harlan tells us nothing about the posited original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment held by the public at the time of the provision’s adoption in 
1868. 
A significant contribution to the discussion of originalism and Brown is found 
in Michael McConnell’s Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions.319 
Addressing the “supposed inconsistency between Brown and the original meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment,”320 McConnell studied “the legal thinking of the 
antagonists in the debate” over the Civil Rights Act of 1875.321 In doing so, he 
posited that congressional actions to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment taken 
between 1868 and 1875 constitute the best evidence of the original meaning of the 
amendment as applied to the school segregation question.322 
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Note McConnell’s discretionary move and interpretive choice. Instead of 
focusing on the Fourteenth Amendment’s 1866–1868 framing-ratification period, he 
examines a seven-year post-adoption period culminating in the enactment of the 
1875 Civil Rights Act.323 Congress debated the constitutionality of school 
segregation as it considered the bill that ultimately became law in 1875 but struck 
from that legislation a provision outlawing school segregation.324 For McConnell, 
this congressional refusal to legislatively proscribe public school segregation did not 
foreclose the conclusion that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibited such segregation. 
 
[I]f instead we assume that the courts must interpret the Amendment in 
light of its most probable understood meaning at the time it was enacted, 
and if we treat the opinions of the congressmen as evidence of the opinions 
of informed people of the day, what should we make of this debate? That 
is, viewing this episode not as an act of lawmaking but as evidence of 
contemporaneous interpretation, what do we learn about the meaning that 
people at that time attached to the words of the Fourteenth Amendment?325  
 
On this view, the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is the same 
as and can be established by an examination of the opinions of members of Congress. 
This approach combines two different and potentially conflicting theories—
Framers’ original intent and original public meaning.326 
McConnell argued that a substantial portion of the members of Congress, 
including members who participated in the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
held the view that school segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment.327 He 
acknowledged that proof that a congressional majority supported legislation banning 
school segregation in the time period of 1871–1875 does not convincingly establish 
that that was the predominant understanding of those who framed and ratified the 
amendment in the 1866–1868 time period.328 Positing continuity in opinion from 
1866 to the enactment of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, he stated that a number of 
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“leaders of the movement to adopt the Fourteenth Amendment” supported the 
movement for the 1875 legislation.329 This supposed continuity may not have 
existed, however, given the material shift in opinions regarding the desirability of 
school integration during the interim between the 1868 adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the 1875 legislation.330  
McConnell also assumed that the majority of both Houses of Congress voting 
in 1872–1874 for legislation that would have desegregated public schools 
“understood themselves to be enforcing the dictates of the Constitution and not 
merely deciding whether they believed public schools should be segregated.”331 A 
vote for a law prohibiting school segregation was, for McConnell, “an implicit (and 
often an explicit) statement regarding the congressman’s interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”332 “Thus, if it is established that a majority supported 
legislation to forbid school segregation under Section 5 [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment], this proves that the majority understood the Fourteenth Amendment 
to forbid the racial segregation of public schools.”333 This analysis is speculative and 
conjectural, for as previously noted, a provision outlawing school segregation that 
may have obtained the imagined majority support was struck from the legislation.334 
Turning to Brown, McConnell observed that the opinion “gives every 
impression that the Court thought it was struggling against the historical 
understanding and original meaning of the Constitution—an impression that, I am 
now convinced, was unnecessary and even misleading.”335 To McConnell, the 
question is what the Fourteenth Amendment meant to “the great mass of citizens and 
their representatives” and not to the amendment’s proponents and enemies.336 In 
McConnell’s view, hostility to the amendment by “a significant segment of the 
population . . . is utterly irrelevant to its meaning,”337 and the intention of the 
amendment’s “most avid proponents” did not matter.338 
McConnell recognized that school segregation was a widespread practice in 
both southern and northern states and the District of Columbia at the time of the 
proposed and ratified Fourteenth Amendment, and that school segregation “almost 
certainly enjoyed the support of a majority of the population even at the height of 
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Reconstruction.”339 He thus doubted that Congress would have proposed and that 
the people of the states would have ratified “an Amendment understood to outlaw 
so deeply engrained an institutional practice.”340 If one stops here, the answer to the 
question “Did the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment circa 1866–1868 
prohibit school segregation?” would be “no.” 
But McConnell did not stop there. As previously noted, he shifted the temporal 
focus away from the 1866–1868 proposal-ratification period to the post-ratification 
period of 1868–1875.341 That discretionary and postoriginalist choice and move 
selects a time period that does not include the inconvenient facts noted in the 
preceding paragraph.342 In answering “yes” to the question “Did the original 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment circa 1868–1875 prohibit school 
segregation?,” McConnell formulated and applied a theory of originalism more 
conducive to his originalist defense of the result in Brown. 
It is also noteworthy that McConnell’s focus on the 1868–1875 time period 
does not discuss in depth an important and relevant event occurring a few years after 
the enactment of the 1875 act, the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877.343 Addressing 
disputed results in the presidential election of 1876 between Republican candidate 
Rutherford B. Hayes and Democratic candidate Samuel J. Tilden, Congress created 
a fifteen-person commission to resolve the election issue.344 When the commission 
ruled in favor of Hayes, he promised Democrats that, in exchange for their 
acceptance of the commission’s decision, he would withdraw federal troops from 
the South and would not enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on racial 
discrimination in voting.345 That deal was accepted, Hayes assumed the presidency, 
and federal troops were removed from the South.346 This development betrayed and 
ended Reconstruction and was followed by “a sea-change in public, intellectual, 
governmental and legal opinion. Support and protection for the rights of black 
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citizens passed away and were replaced by the regime of Jim Crow.”347 Expanding 
the 1868–1875 review period by a few years brings into the sociopolitical and legal 
picture a significant development of great relevance to an argument grounded in a 
purported postoriginalist public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Now consider Michael Stokes Paulsen’s recent argument that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits public school segregation.348 Paulsen “focuses on the 
objective original linguistic meaning of the words of the text, in context, rather than 
on the subjective intentions or expectations of specific persons involved in the 
process of enacting them—a distinction foundational to written 
constitutionalism.”349 In his view, the text of the Equal Protection Clause “appear[s] 
to state a sufficiently determinate rule that the government may not treat classes of 
persons differently and adversely for purposes of legal privileges and entitlements 
because of race.”350 Noting that “[t]here is perhaps some room to argue about 
whether this is the necessary meaning of the words of the text, and over the exact 
scope of the principle stated,” he concludes that this “is not much of a textual stretch 
at all: it is a reasonably straight-line reading of the language; if there is room to argue 
over this reading, it is not a great deal of room.”351 Paulsen thus reads and chooses 
to construct a clause purposefully written at a high level of generality as if it sets 
forth a governing rule written at a narrow and specific level of generality.352 
Does public school segregation on the basis of race violate Paulsen’s Equal 
Protection Clause’s rule/principle?353 Referring to the “real-world factual and social 
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context” of racial segregation practices in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
Paulsen states that the answer to that question “was an embarrassingly obvious 
yes.”354 That “not all persons in the generation that drafted and ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment” comprehended “this [was] largely beside the point” and 
did “not alter the meaning of the language used in the Constitution” or “the reality 
that racial segregation violated that meaning.”355 Accordingly, “Brown was rightly 
decided . . . on reasonably straightforward textual-interpretation reasoning.”356 
Paulsen’s certainty that Brown was correctly decided as an original matter must 
not mask critical interpretive choices made en route to that conclusion. His textualist 
focus on an objective original linguistic meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is 
different from the textualist methodology proposed in his earlier work. Recall that 
Paulsen and his coauthor declared (1) that the words and phrases of the Constitution 
must be applied “in accordance with the meaning they would have had at the time 
they were adopted as law, within the political and linguistic community that adopted 
the text as law,” and (2) that this methodology asks how those words and phrases 
“would have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-
informed reader of those words and phrases, in context, at the time they were 
adopted, and within the political and linguistic community in which they were 
adopted.”357 His analysis discussed in the two preceding paragraphs does not 
explicitly assess the original meaning at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; nor does he expressly inquire about the adoption-time understanding 
of a hypothetical reasonable person in a particular political and linguistic 
community. In his 2013 analysis view, the views of the drafting and ratifying 
generations do not matter. The text prohibits racial discrimination. For Paulsen, 
nothing more is needed. 
More—much more—is needed, however, for those who do not accept 
Paulsen’s view that the text of the Equal Protection Clause sets out a determinate 
rule and principle governing the resolution of the school segregation issue. Paulsen’s 
proffered no-race-discrimination approach does what the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
drafting committee did not do.358 The text of the adopted clause, framed and written 
at a higher level of generality, does not expressly refer to race, does not explicitly 
require equality, and does not forbid racial segregation.359 While the provision’s 
“general concern—equality—is clear enough,’” the “content beyond that cannot be 
derived from anything within its four corners . . . .”360  
If Paulsen is correct that state-mandated racial discrimination violates the Equal 
Protection Clause, the question remains whether as an original matter the clause 
prohibits racial discrimination in all of its forms and manifestations. As Paulsen 
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notes, the exact scope of an equality principle is arguable.361 At the time of the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, that scope did not encompass and protect 
the social right to a desegregated public school education.362 If this is correct, the 
no-race-discrimination rule/principle he finds in the text is consistent with 
contemporary approaches to and understandings of the Equal Protection Clause, but 
it is not consistent with—indeed is contrary to—the adoption-time original meaning 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
Additionally, Paulsen’s analysis refers to an unspecified factual and social 
context of nineteenth- and twentieth-century practices of racial segregation.363 This 
is a finding of original linguistic meaning informed and confirmed by events 
occurring long after the drafting and ratification period which were obviously and 
by definition not known to those living in mid-nineteenth-century America.  
Another recent originalist effort to justify the result in Brown is found in Steven 
Calabresi and Michael Perl’s article Originalism and Brown v. Board of 
Education.364 Making a legal argument that “is complex and could easily have been 
missed by many, if not most, Americans living in 1868,”365 the authors argue that 
“the right to a public school education was already by 1868 a fundamental state 
constitutional right of state citizenship and that segregation in public schools was 
therefore unconstitutional from 1868 on.”366 In fact, they contend, “Brown is only 
justifiable on originalist grounds—at least if one focuses on the right to a public 
school education as it stood in state constitutional law in 1868 and in 1954.”367 
Calabresi and Perl state that Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment “was 
publicly understood as providing a constitutional basis for the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, which in turn protected the civil rights of individuals, but not their political 
rights.”368 (Note the absence of any reference to social rights.)369 In their view, the 
rights specifically protected by the 1866 statute370 were not the only fundamental 
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause; 
that clause also protects “fundamental civil rights that are deeply rooted in American 
history and tradition.”371 Thus, they argue, “[a]ny right that existed widely in 1868, 
the year the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, could fairly be argued to be a 
fundamental right that is deeply rooted in American history and tradition and . . . is 
therefore a ‘Privilege or Immunity’ of national or state citizenship.”372 And, they 
                                                 
361 See Paulsen, supra note 348, at 1401–02. 
362 See supra notes 175–181 and accompanying text. 
363 See Paulsen, supra note 348, at 1403. 
364 See Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of 
Education, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 429–33.  
365 Id. at 569. 
366 Id. at 435.  
367 Id. at 440. 
368 Id. at 441. 
369 See supra notes 175–181 and accompanying text. 
370 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
371 Calabresi & Perl, supra note 364, at 441. 
372 Id. at 442.  
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further contend, any right protected in 1868 by more than three-quarters of the state 
constitutions—the number of states required to amend the Constitution pursuant to 
Article V of the Constitution373—“is a strong candidate to be a Fourteenth 
Amendment fundamental right.”374 
By the authors’ count, in 1868 the constitutions of thirty of the thirty-seven 
states in the union explicitly required the establishment of a public school system; 
three states required school funding but did not mandate public schools; and four 
states did not recognize the right to a free public education.375 “It is thus as clear as 
day that there was an Article V consensus of three-quarters of the states in 1868 that 
recognized that children have a fundamental right to a free public school 
education.”376 That right was “a privilege or immunity of state citizenship . . . as to 
which racial discrimination was forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
outcome of Brown v. Board of Education was thus a correct outcome not only in 
1954 but also in 1868.”377 Calabresi and Perl acknowledge that their fundamentality 
analysis runs counter to San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,378 
wherein the Court held that there is no fundamental right to a public school education 
under the Equal Protection Clause.379 Expressing no opinion as to whether Rodriguez 
was correctly decided, they argue that it is possible that Rodriguez was wrongly 
decided on the basis of the erroneous assumption that there is no right to a public 
education.380 They also note that Rodriguez did not employ their count-the-states 
analysis and consider the fact that three-quarters of state constitutions in effect in 
1868 recognized the right to a public school education, a “fact [that] is obviously 
relevant to the question of whether the right to an education was deeply rooted in 
American history and tradition.”381  
Moreover, Calabresi and Perl disagree with Michael McConnell’s observation 
that it was not likely that “Congress would have proposed, or the . . . states would 
have ratified, an Amendment understood to outlaw [the] deeply engrained” practice 
of school segregation.382 They complained that McConnell focused on the actual 
                                                 
373 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
374 Calabresi & Perl, supra note 364, at 443. 
375 See id. at 438, 450–56.  
376 Id. at 460. 
377 Id. 
378 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
379 Id. at 33–34; see Calabresi & Perl, supra note 364, at 558–63. In concluding that 
education is not a fundamental right, the Court opined that education “is not among the rights 
afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for 
saying it is implicitly so protected.” Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35. Not disputing the plaintiff’s 
assertion that education is essential to the exercise of First Amendment freedoms and the 
right to vote, the Court stated that it has “never presumed to possess either the ability or the 
authority to guarantee to the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral 
choice.” Id. at 36.  
380 See Calabresi & Perl, supra note 364, at 560. 
381 Id. at 560–61.  
382 Id. at 466 (quoting McConnell, supra note 14, at 956); see supra notes 339–340 and 
accompanying text. 
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state practices in the 1860s and not on the text of state constitutional provisions in 
place in 1868.383 Unlike the examination of state constitutions conducted in their 
approach, McConnell’s approach “reflects a kind of realism that disregards the law 
and the actual text of the state constitutions.”384 
Calabresi and Perl’s analysis is problematic in several respects. First, they 
recognize that their legal argument could have been missed by many if not most 
Americans living in 1868. If most of the public did not know of or could not 
comprehend their particular originalist approach, one must question whether and 
how any original public meaning or other understanding did exist or could have 
existed. 
Second, Calabresi and Perl’s fundamental rights analysis imports a 
nonoriginalist and itself discretionary methodology into their originalist analysis. 
They cite two substantive due process cases, Washington v. Glucksberg385 and 
Lawrence v. Texas,386 in which the Court employed not originalism but a separate 
and distinct due process traditionalist methodology387 (an approach questioned by 
                                                 
383 Calabresi & Perl, supra note 364, at 464. 
384 Id. Anticipating the critique that their formalistic reliance on the texts of 1868 state 
constitutions does not consider how state education clauses were actually applied and that 
“the actual practice on the ground was one of racial segregation,” id. at 564, the authors 
provide two responses. First, “no state constitution required racially segregated public 
schools in 1868” and, beginning in 1870, fifteen states revised their constitutions and 
explicitly required school segregation. Id. at 565. If racially segregated schools were 
common in 1868, “there should have been no need for the fifteen state constitutional 
provisions requiring racially segregated schools . . . .” Id. Second, “maybe racial segregation 
in public schools was not commonplace in 1868, and it only started to appear in 1870.” Id.  
385 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
386 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
387 Traditionalism interprets the Constitution “in accordance with the long-standing and 
evolving practices, experiences, and tradition of the nation.” Michael W. McConnell, 
Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1133 (1998). 
Traditionalism is thus different from and should not be confused with originalism’s search 
for the fixed meaning of constitutional text. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl J. Levinson, 
The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1211, 1241 
(1998). 
Glucksberg held that the asserted right to assistance in committing suicide was not a 
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
521 U.S. at 728. In so holding the Court looked to, among other things, 700 years of Anglo-
American common-law tradition punishing or disapproving of suicide and assisted suicide; 
id. at 711; the common-law approach adopted by the American colonies; id.; the prohibition 
of suicide in colonial and state legislatures and courts; id. at 712–13; the criminalization of 
assisted suicide in most states at the time of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
1868; id. at 714–15; and states’ recent reexamination and reaffirmation of the assisted suicide 
ban. Id. at 715–16. 
Lawrence struck down as violating the Due Process Clause a Texas statute making it a 
crime for two people of the same sex to engage in certain intimate conduct. 539 U.S. 558, 
578–79 (2003). The Court conducted a historical survey beginning with English criminal 
laws passed in 1533 and continuing through the prohibition of sodomy in the American 
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originalist Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas).388 The Court’s due process 
traditionalism analysis is not limited to and does not seek to determine the fixed 
meaning of constitutional text at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868.389 Under that approach, the Court surveys historical events and 
developments at various points in time including, but not limited to, the time of the 
adoption of a constitutional provision.390  
Third, Calabresi and Perl’s fundamental rights/count-the-state-constitutions 
analysis illustrates the importance of an interpreter’s discretion to frame the inquiry 
and the level of generality at which a claimed right should be characterized. In 
Glucksberg, a substantive due process decision cited by the authors, the Court 
instructed that “a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest” 
is required.391 The specific Fourteenth Amendment issue of the constitutionality of 
state-mandated school segregation addressed in Brown is narrower than the broader 
and more general claimed right to a free public education as framed by Calabresi 
and Perl. Relevant and material to a careful description of the asserted interest is 
evidence of the actual existence of racially segregated schools in the states and not 
just the number of state constitutions containing public education provisions. 
Calabresi and Perl’s sole and limited focus on the text of state constitutions ignores 
                                                 
colonies, the absence of state criminal prosecutions of persons engaging in same-sex 
relations until the 1970s, and state abolition of criminal laws prohibiting same-sex relations 
over the past few decades. Id. at 568–72. The Court then concluded that the nation’s “laws 
and traditions in the past half century . . . show an emerging awareness that liberty” protects 
adults with regard to their decisions concerning their private sexual conduct. Id. at 571–72.  
Interestingly, in the majority opinion in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy stated that the 
Framers and Ratifiers of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
“might have been more specific” if they had “known the components of liberty in its 
manifold possibilities.” Id. at 578.  
 
They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain 
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper 
in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every 
generation can invoke its principles on their own search for greater freedom. 
 
Id. at 578–79. This passage clearly speaks to an evolving and not fixed constitutional 
meaning. 
388 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (expressing his “misgivings about Substantive Due Process as an original 
matter”); id. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing 
that “the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment offers a superior alternative” to the 
“legal fiction” of the Court’s substantive due process doctrine).  
389 See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
390 See supra note 387 and accompanying text. 
391 Id. at 721 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Collins v. City of Harker 
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277–
78 (1990)). 
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“the vast gap that can separate the law on the books from the law in life.”392 That the 
text of a constitution proclaims a right or mandates certain protections does not mean 
that that right or protection actually existed in the real world.393 Actual history, lived 
experiences, and the real social meaning of racial segregation and subordination in 
public education and other areas matter. A sanitized account and exclusive focus on 
text renders invisible racist and white supremacist realities and fails to fully and 
accurately capture the specifics and dynamics of American apartheid. 
Calabresi and Perl also state that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects 
traditional and deeply rooted “fundamental civil rights” and argue that any right 
existing in 1868 could fairly be argued to be fundamental.394 Missing again is any 
recognition that the school integration issue involved a social and not a civil right. 
And the argument that any right existing in 1868 was arguably fundamental cannot 
be correct in all circumstances. Some rights may have been traditional and deeply 
rooted at that time; other rights in existence in 1868 may have been new or recent 
and therefore non-traditional and not yet deeply rooted ones. A more specific and 
precise description of the deeply rooted fundamentality approach is needed.  
Fourth, and finally, Calabresi and Perl’s Article V consensus argument is a 
departure from the formalist view that “the only way We the People can speak is 
through the forms specified by Article V.”395 As Calabresi noted in an earlier work, 
“Legitimate transformative social change only happens, as it did in 1868 . . . when 
two-thirds of both houses of Congress and three-quarters of the states agree on a 
textual change.”396 Calabresi and Perl’s Article V consensus argument is not 
formalist, for they seek legal recognition of a purported fundamental right not 
actually considered, tested, and added to the Constitution via the Article V 
amendment process and by We the People. This consensus analysis is not consistent 
with fixed and original public meaning originalism.  
 
D.  Framework Originalism 
 
Jack Balkin’s framework originalism considers the concepts referred to in the 
words in the Equal Protection Clause at the time of that provision’s enactment.397 
“This is not purely an investigation into semantic definitions. We also want to know 
                                                 
392 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 298 (2014). 
393 See Ann Bartow, Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers: Online Surveillance Versus 
Economic Development in the People’s Republic of China, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 856 (2013) 
(noting the “disconnect between enumerated constitutional rights” in the Chinese 
Constitution “and the lived reality of Chinese people”); Paul D. Carrington, Writing Other 
Peoples’ Constitutions, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 167, 172 (2007) (“The Soviet 
Constitution published in 1924 proclaimed all manner of individual rights but was merely 
hortatory . . . .”). 
394 See supra notes 371–372 and accompanying text. 
395 ACKERMAN, supra note 392, at 19. 
396 Steven G. Calabresi, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Guarantee Equal Justice for 
All?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 156 (2011). 
397 BALKIN, supra note 41, at 13. 
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if words in the clause were understood nonliterally—for example, as a metaphor or 
a synecdoche—and we want to know whether some words referred to generally 
recognized terms of art.”398 
For Balkin, the original meaning of the “equal protection of the laws” is 
enforced “today because the text continues to require it, just as the text continues to 
require that the president must be thirty-five years old.”399 Balkin submits that 
today’s application of the principles of equal protection may differ from the 
expectations people had in 1868 given our contemporary understandings and prior 
constitutional constructions.400 Vague and abstract clauses, like the Equal Protection 
Clause, “will likely reflect contemporary understandings rather than original 
understandings” as principles and standards are applied in changed circumstances.401 
What, then, are the underlying principles of the Equal Protection Clause? 
Balkin identifies four types of prohibited unequal treatment: 1) laws making 
“arbitrary and unreasonable distinctions between persons”; 2) “‘class legislation’ . . 
. unjustifiably singl[ing] out a group for special benefits or special burdens”; 3) 
“‘caste’ legislation . . . creat[ing] or maintain[ing] a disfavored caste or subordinated 
. . . group”; and 4) legislation restricting the “basic rights of citizenship” and treating 
persons as “second-class citizens.”402  
Balkin concludes that state-mandated racial segregation in public schools 
violates these principles.403 Accordingly, Brown is an “obvious and uncomplicated 
application[] of the principles underlying the Fourteenth Amendment” and is a 
constitutional construction “foundational to our understanding of the equal 
protection clause.”404 Not bound by expected applications or the original public 
meaning or Framers’ intent or ratifiers’ understandings, Balkin’s heuristic and 
discretionary framework analysis of the Equal Protection Clause easily squares 




As demonstrated in this Part, the constitutional originalism employed by those 
addressing and answering in the affirmative the question whether Brown can be 
squared with and justified by originalism is in fact a discretionary interpretive 
methodology. Consider these discretionary moves:  
 
1. The formulation of a core idea of black equality protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and putting the Brown Court to the choice of equality or segregation 
(Bork). 
                                                 
398 Id.  
399 Id. at 44. 
400 See id. 
401 Id. 
402 Id. at 222. 
403 Id. at 230–31. 
404 Id. at 231. 
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2. A textualist approach to the Privileges or Immunities Clause yielding a no-
school-segregation directive not found in the text of that provision and not consistent 
with the Reconstruction-era taxonomy of rights (Perry). 
3. Combining the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s abolition of slavery and invoking Justice Harlan’s dissent 
in Plessy v. Ferguson (Justice Scalia). 
4. A focus on the post-adoption time period of 1868–1875 instead of the 1866–
1868 proposal/ratification period of the Fourteenth Amendment (McConnell). 
5. The formulation of a posited and textually derived determinate 
rule/principle violated by public school racial segregation and characterizing as 
beside the point the views of those in the Fourteenth Amendment’s drafting and 
ratifying generation (Paulsen). 
6. The articulation of a legal argument so complex that it could have been 
missed by those living in 1868, and the finding that by 1868 and as of 1954 the right 
to a public school education was fundamental and school segregation was therefore 
unconstitutional (Calabresi and Perl). 
7. A framework originalist analysis identifying and applying underlying 
principles of the Equal Protection Clause and concluding that public school 
segregation on the basis of race violates those principles (Balkin).  
 
These moves and choices and the marking of different paths to the Brown-is-
originalist terminus do not meaningfully constrain interpreter discretion, nor do they 
faithfully and consistently seek the discoverable intent, understanding, or public 
meaning of a constitutional provision at the time of its adoption. Originalists seeking 
to demonstrate that Brown was rightly decided have clearly exercised discretion in 
ways that call into question the claimed constraining and restraining functions of 
originalism.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has examined originalists’ efforts to demonstrate that the result 
reached by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education is consistent with 
and justified by originalism. As discussed herein, originalism is a discretionary 
interpretive methodology presenting originalists with several interpretive choice 
points and ample room for the introduction of an interpreter’s preferences, 
predilections, values, and beliefs. That discretion has been exercised in originalist 
accounts contending (wrongly, in my view) that Brown’s invalidation of state-
mandated racial segregation in public schools can be squared with the original intent, 
understanding, or public meaning of the Reconstruction-era Fourteenth Amendment. 
The concern that an interpretive approach leading to the conclusion that Brown 
was wrongly decided would not pass “the acid test” of originalism405 need not lead 
to the concoction of “implausible accounts of the Reconstruction Era understanding 
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of segregation.”406 “Man is not the measure of all things, as Socrates replied to the 
Sophists, and neither is Brown . . . . An interpretation of the Constitution is not wrong 
because it would produce a different result in Brown.”407 One could thus conclude 
that under a preferred interpretive methodology Brown was wrongly decided without 
calling into question the general validity of that methodology.408 While this would 
not alleviate the concern of some that such a conclusion could discredit originalism, 
it would be a candid acknowledgment that undiluted and unflinching originalism 
can in fact lead to an undesirable result and outcome (for example, school 
segregation does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment). Such methodological 
purity and consistency could reduce the temptation to make and act on discretionary 
and outcome-influential choices that evade and avoid the Brown-was-wrongly-
decided position. 
                                                 
406 Dorf, supra note 16, at 958. 
407 John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 
1385, 1463 n.295 (1992). 
408 See VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 280. Vermeule advocates a Thayerian regime of 
judicial review in which judges defer to the legislatures and administrative agencies when 
the meaning of legal text is not clear and specific. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin 
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 142–43 
(1893). Vermeule acknowledges that on this view “Brown was indeed wrong, in the sense 
that the judges had no business deciding that sort of question in the first place.” VERMEULE, 
supra note 16, at 280. While “[t]here is no general mechanism that can produce only happy 
endings,” under Vermeule’s approach the Court would not have “declared a constitutional 
right to own slaves,” “invalidated a generation’s worth of legislation against child labor,” or 
“invalidated congressional attempts to provide legal redress for gender-motivated violence.” 
Id. at 281. 
